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INDIAN COUNTRY
AND THE TERRITORY CLAUSE:
WASHINGTON’S PROMISE AT THE FRAMING
JOHN HAYDEN DOSSETT*
This Article explores the Territory Clause, Article IV, Section 3, as a source of
power for federal laws in “Indian country,” as defined at 18 U.S.C § 1151. In
contrast to plenary power doctrine, the Territory Clause offers a textual source of
authority to regulate matters unrelated to commerce, such as criminal
jurisdiction, in Indian country. Intended to constitutionalize the Northwest
Ordinance of 1787, the Territory Clause provides a principled rather than
plenary basis for congressional initiatives in Indian policy and a constitutional
source of authority tempered by the duty of “utmost good faith.” This renewed
understanding of the Territory Clause makes certain the source of federal
authority in Indian country, and provides a stronger interpretive lens for
matters of tribal sovereignty, land rights, taxation, and criminal justice.
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I would only observe; . . . that the Tribes of Indians within our
Territory are numerous, soured and jealous; that Communications
must be established with the exterior Posts; And, that it may be policy
and economy, to appear respectable in the Eyes of the Indians, at
the Commencement of our National Intercourse and Traffic with
them.

—George Washington1
INTRODUCTION
A.

The Problem of Plenary Power in Federal Indian Law

The federal government comprehensively regulates indigenous
peoples in the United States, as well as fifty-seven million acres of tribal
lands, an area larger than Idaho.2 In this area defined as the “Indian
country,” the Department of Justice enforces a unique federal criminal
code found at Chapter 53 of Title 18 of the United States Code. The
Department of the Interior’s expansive authority is evident in Title 25
of the United States Code, covering subjects as varied as tribal
government organization, tribal courts, civil rights, law enforcement,
Indian health care, education, housing, cultural resources, land titles
and records, probate, agriculture, forestry, and mining.3 In recent
decades, federal policy has become less paternalistic, supporting tribal
self-determination and empowering tribal governments to take greater
control and responsibility within their homelands.4
Tribal self-government has many benefits, but also raises new legal
questions that seemed long settled. If the federal government has
limited powers under the Constitution, where does it derive its
authority to enact such comprehensive laws related to Indian tribes
and native peoples? The Supreme Court has historically deferred to
Congress on this question, devising a theory of plenary authority that
resulted in great loss of tribal lands and rights during the nineteenth
1. George Washington’s Sentiments on a Peace Establishment, 1 May 1783, FOUNDERS
ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-11202.
2. See DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON INDIAN TRUST
ADMINISTRATION AND REFORM 16 (2013) (“On trust lands . . . [the Department of the
Interior (DOI)] is responsible for managing [fifty-six] million surface acres and [fiftyseven] million acres of subsurface mineral estates . . . .”).
3. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1–5636 (2012).
4. The Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, id. §§ 5301–
5423, is the primary example but there are many others, including the Indian Health
Care Improvement Act, id. §§ 1601–1683, the HEARTH Act, id. § 415(h), and the
Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211 (2010).
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and early twentieth centuries.5 More recently, seemingly in reaction to
federal laws that restore tribal rights, some members of the Court and
Congress are inclined to limit federal power to its enumerated sources
and have questioned whether Congress has any power in Indian affairs
other than the regulation of commerce.6 Questions regarding the sources
of federal authority in Indian affairs pose a new challenge within the field.
The purpose of this Article is to begin a reexamination of textual sources.
Federal authority in Indian affairs is customarily traced to two
sources in the Constitution. First, Article I’s Commerce Clause
empowers Congress “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”7 This clause
recognizes the inherent sovereignty of Indian tribes similar to that of
states and foreign nations. Congress’s three powers—over foreign
commerce, interstate commerce, and Indian commerce—have different
applications, but were all “given in the same words, and in the same
breath, as it were.”8 Although federal power over commerce and trade
with Indian tribes is very broad, it is doubtful that it extends to subjects
such as criminal jurisdiction or civil rights.
Second, Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution, commonly known
as the Treaty Clause, gives the President the power “to make Treaties,
provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.”9 The Supreme
Court has said that a treaty is “primarily a compact between independent

5. See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903) (maintaining that
Congress continuously exercised plenary authority over tribal relations); Cherokee
Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294, 308 (1902) (“The power existing in Congress to
administer upon and guard the tribal property, and the power being political and
administrative in its nature, the manner of its exercise is a question within the province
of the legislative branch to determine, and is not one for the courts.”); Stephens v.
Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445, 488 (1899) (reaffirming the constitutionality of
congressional authority to determine citizenship within Indian tribes because tribal
lands are public and not held by individuals).
6. Compare Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2567 (2013) (Thomas,
J., concurring) (reflecting upon the inadequacy of relying on congressional authority
under the Indian Commerce Clause when the claim involved neither Indian tribes nor
commerce, but instead included “noneconomic activity such as adoption of children”),
with White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1980) (“Congress has
broad power to regulate tribal affairs under the Indian Commerce Clause . . . .”).
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
8. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 228 (1824) (Johnson, J., concurring)
(remarking upon the breadth of the Commerce Clause, which simultaneously provides
Congress with the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, among the states,
and with Indian tribes).
9. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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nations.”10 Although the Treaty Clause does not specifically reference
Indian tribes, hundreds of Indian treaties were established between
the United States and Tribal Nations,11 and President Washington
insisted that the Senate ratify Indian treaties in the same manner as
foreign treaties.12 In 1871, Congress signaled it would no longer ratify
Indian treaties, ending the nearly 100-year-old practice, and would
instead unilaterally regulate Indian affairs by statute.13
Neither the Commerce Clause nor the Treaty Clause provides
federal authority for the types of intrusive legislation that followed the
end of the treaty-making period. In that era, the Supreme Court
developed a new federal authority in Indian affairs: a “plenary” power
drawn from sources outside the text of the Constitution.14 Beginning
in 1886 with United States v. Kagama15 and running to United States v.
Lara16 in 2004, a long series of Supreme Court decisions synthesized
congressional authority over Indian affairs into a nearly unlimited authority.
Such authority was based on a guardian-ward relationship between the
federal government and the Indian tribes, as well as the “preconstitutional
powers necessarily inherent in any Federal Government.”17
Professor Nell Newton traced the history of federal authority in
Indian affairs in her seminal work, focusing on the development of the
plenary power doctrine.18 Plenary power developed as a form of
deference to Congress and as justification for nineteenth century laws
taking tribal lands and interfering with tribal rights of self-government.
Newton concluded that the original reasons for the doctrine are no
longer applicable, as the country has been settled and notions of racial
inferiority have been repudiated.19 Nevertheless, federal courts continue
10. Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884).
11. See generally 2 CHARLES J. KAPPLER, INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES (1904).
12. Letter from George Washington to the United States Senate, 17 September
1789, FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/0504-02-0032 (last visited Oct. 17, 2018).
13. Indian Appropriation Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 566 (codified
at 25 U.S.C. § 71 (2012)) (stating that “[n]o Indian nation or tribe within the territory
of the United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation,
tribe, or power with whom the United States may contract by treaty”).
14. FELIX S. COHEN, COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, § 5.01, at 383–91
(Nell Newton Jessup ed., 2012).
15. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
16. 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
17. Id. at 201.
18. Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations,
132 U. PA. L. REV. 195, 197 (1984).
19. Id. at 236.
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to rely on plenary power or invocations of similarly broad authorities not
enumerated in the text of the Constitution.20 Professor Phil Frickey captured
both the legal and ethical concerns with plenary power:
Its apparent inconsistency with the most fundamental of
constitutional principles—the McCulloch understanding that
Congress ordinarily possesses only that authority delegated to it in
the Constitution—is an embarrassment of constitutional theory. . . .
Its holding, which intimates that congressional power over Indian
affairs is limitless, is an embarrassment of humanity.21

Now that Congress is enacting laws that support tribal selfgovernment, some members of the Supreme Court question
Congress’s authority to do so. Justice Thomas has led these efforts,
raising sharp concerns with plenary power in a series of concurrences
and dissents to Indian law decisions. Justice Thomas’ efforts began in
2004, with a concurrence in Lara, which was the Court’s third decision
to grapple with determining the scope of tribal criminal jurisdiction.22
First, in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,23 the Court found tribal
governments implicitly divested of criminal jurisdiction over nonIndians.24 A decade later in Duro v. Reina,25 the Court found tribes
divested of criminal jurisdiction over members of another Indian
tribe.26 After tribal leaders raised significant public safety concerns,
Congress promptly overturned Duro, amending the Indian Civil Rights
Act.27 The Act restored “the inherent power of Indian tribes, hereby
recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all

20. Id. at 240.
21. Philip P. Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 31, 35
(1996) (footnote omitted); see also Robert N. Clinton, There is No Federal Supremacy
Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113, 163 (2002).
22. 541 U.S. 193, 214 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring).
23. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
24. Id. at 210 (saying the United States’ sovereignty meant Indians relinquished the
power to try non-Indian citizens except in a manner Congress would have approved).
25. 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
26. Id. at 685–86 (determining that the sovereignty to exercise criminal
jurisdiction over members of other Indian tribes was inconsistent with the retained
sovereignty of Indian tribes because Indian sovereignty had become internal, focused
on managing and maintaining their respective customs and order).
27. Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. II–VII, §§ 201–701, 82 Stat. 77 (1968). See generally
Angela R. Riley, Crime and Governance in Indian Country, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1564, 1581–
89 (2016) (discussing the prevalent issue of violent crime within Indian tribes due to
the absence of consistent criminal jurisdiction and the resulting momentum towards
the 2010 Tribal Law and Order Act).
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Indians.”28 Fourteen years later, in Lara, the Court upheld this “Duro
fix” in the face of a double jeopardy challenge where Lara faced both
tribal and federal prosecution.29 Justice Breyer’s majority opinion
found no double jeopardy because Tribal Nations are separate
sovereigns from the federal government.30 He relied on Congress’s
plenary power, including “the constitutional power to relax restrictions
that the political branches have, over time, placed on the exercise of a
tribe’s inherent legal authority.”31
In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas disagreed with the
majority’s conclusion in Lara that such authority could be found in the
plenary power doctrine.32 He argued that the Treaty Clause is not a
power to legislate, and that the Commerce Clause does not provide
Congress with power over criminal matters.33 Notably, Justice Thomas
would extend the United States v. Lopez34 and United States v. Morrison35
Commerce Clause limitations to the Indian Commerce Clause:36 “I
cannot agree that the Indian Commerce Clause ‘provide[s] Congress
with plenary power to legislate in the field of Indian affairs.’”37
Since 2004, Justice Thomas has raised questions with plenary power
in four subsequent decisions: Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl,38 Puerto Rico
28. Pub. L. No. 101-511, tit. VIII, § 8077(b), (c), 104 Stat. 1892 (1990) (codified at
25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2012)).
29. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 210 (2004) (determining that the Double
Jeopardy Clause did not preclude federal prosecution for a discrete federal offense given that,
after Duro, Indian tribes retained the inherent sovereign authority of tribal prosecutions).
30. See id. (holding that Congress has the constitutional authority to allow tribes to
prosecute nonmember Indians).
31. Id. at 196.
32. Id. at 215 (Thomas, J., concurring).
33. Id. at 222–23.
34. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
35. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
36. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617 (rejecting “the argument that Congress may regulate
noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct’s aggregate effect
on interstate commerce”); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567–68 (invalidating a federal law that
criminalized possession of a firearm within one thousand feet of a school, as an
overreach of Commerce Clause authority).
37. Lara, 541 U.S. at 224 (alteration in original) (quoting Cotton Petroleum Corp.
v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989)).
38. 570 U.S. 637 (2013). Thomas’s concurrence questions the source of federal
authority for the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963, governing
the removal of Indian children from their families. Id. at 658–59. Although not
addressed here, the Constitution grants Congress the power to define and punish
“Offences against the Law of Nations.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. Emer de Vattel
recognized the citizenship of children as a subject of the Law of Nations, stating that
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v. Sanchez Valle,39 United States v. Bryant,40 and, most recently, Town of
Vernon v. United States.41 Two of these cases are most relevant. In Bryant,
he questioned Congress’s authority for the Major Crimes Act, under
which the federal government has imposed felony sentences on Indian
defendants since 1885.42 In his Town of Vernon dissent from the denial
of certiorari, he questioned the authority of the federal government to
acquire and hold title to tribal lands, an authority that the United
States has exercised since the Continental Congress, and that the
Secretary of the Interior implements regularly under the Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934.43
Justice Kennedy also raised concerns with plenary power. Justice
Kennedy authored the majority opinion in Duro, discounting any tribal
authority over territory and finding that tribal jurisdiction exists only
because of the “voluntary character of tribal membership and the
concomitant right of participation in a tribal government.”44
Furthermore, Justice Kennedy concurred separately in Lara to
reemphasize his view that voluntary tribal membership provides the
only basis for tribal criminal jurisdiction.45 He found it troubling that
Congress could “relax the restrictions on inherent tribal sovereignty in
a way that extends that sovereignty beyond those historical limits.”46
Questions on plenary authority are also arising within Congress,
creating a new obstacle to legislation that would address problems in
Indian country and strengthen tribal self-government. For example, in

“it is presumed, as matter of course, that each citizen, on entering into society, reserves
to his children the right of becoming members of it.” EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF
NATIONS § 212, at 101 (1849); see also John Hayden Dossett, Tribal Nations and Congress’s
Power to Define Offences against the Law of Nations, 80 MONT. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018).
39. 136 S. Ct. 1863 (2016).
40. 136 S. Ct. 1954 (2016).
41. Nos. 16-1320, 17-8 (U.S. Nov. 27, 2017) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denials of
certiorari).
42. See Bryant, 136 S. Ct. at 1968 (Thomas, J., concurring) (questioning the breadth
of congressional authority to enact the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2012)).
43. See Vernon, Nos. 16-1320, 17-8, at *2 (U.S. Nov. 27, 2017) (Thomas, J., dissenting
from denials of certiorari) (arguing that the Supreme Court should have granted
certiorari to reconsider the constitutionality of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1935,
25 U.S.C. § 5108 (2012)).
44. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 694 (1990).
45. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 212 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(declining to find a violation of double jeopardy because Lara did not object to the
tribe’s authority to try him, and the federal government already had jurisdiction over
Lara because of inherent sovereign authority).
46. Id.
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2013, Congress addressed problems created by the Oliphant decision,47
and recognized tribal authority to prosecute domestic violence crimes
committed by non-Indians.48 This legislation faced opposition from some
members of Congress who questioned the source of congressional authority
to recognize and restore tribal criminal jurisdiction.49
In this context, it is worthwhile to reexamine the constitutional
sources of federal authority in Indian affairs. Although plenary power
remains an important legal doctrine, members of Congress and the
Court are seeking to limit federal action to enumerated sources and
narrowly construe the Commerce Clause.50 When tribal leaders ask
Congress to address problems in Indian country, legislation is
vulnerable to questions about the source of federal authority. Even if
Congress can be convinced, new laws are frequently challenged, and
federal courts are searching for sources of enumerated constitutional
authority rather than inferred powers.
Fortunately, strict construction and original meaning are home turf
for Indian tribes, who were at the forefront of the Framers’ concerns
during and after the Revolutionary War.51 Federal power and
responsibility are deeply embedded in federal title to Indian lands,
providing ample authority for modernizing Federal Indian law while
respecting tribal sovereignty and encouraging tribal self-government.

47. Post-Oliphant, tribal authorities lacked jurisdiction over non-Indians, which
precluded any ability to prosecute “non-Indian” crimes occurring on tribal lands. In
particular, tribal authorities could not prosecute non-Indian perpetrators of domestic
violence against Indian women. See Angela R. Riley, Crime and Governance in Indian Country,
63 UCLA L. REV. 1564, 1581–83 (2016) (detailing the domestic violence-related issues in
prosecuting, especially when a white man would abuse a Native American woman).
48. 25 U.S.C. § 1304 (Supp. IV 2017) (amending the Indian Civil Rights Act to
extend tribal jurisdiction to crimes of domestic violence).
49. The opposition arose from members of Congress who follow the writings of
the Heritage Foundation. See Paul J. Larkin, Jr. & Joseph Luppino-Esposito, The
Violence Against Women Act, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, and Indian Tribal Courts, 27 BYU
J. PUB. L. 1, 5–10 (2012). Tribal leaders might be forgiven for suspicion of this new
mode of thought. For generations, Congress has been content to rely on an atextual
plenary power when restricting the rights of Indian tribes. Now, in an era where it is
possible to contemplate expanding tribal authority, Congress’s power is sharply
questioned. However, this is not unique to Indian affairs. There is generally an
increased focus on strict adherence to enumerated constitutional authorities. Currently,
the Rules of the House of Representatives require that every bill include a Constitutional
Authority Statement citing the constitutional power granted to Congress. Rules of the
House of Representatives, Rule XII(7)(c)(1), H.R. Doc. No. 113-181, at 629 (2015).
50. See supra notes 14–21 and accompanying text.
51. See supra Section I.B.
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Solution: The Original Meaning of the Territory Clause

The Territory Clause is a primary source of federal authority in
Indian affairs. There are three bases for this contention. The first is
structural. The United States holds land in trust, or restricted fee, for
Indian tribes and their individual members.52 Because the United
States holds an interest in title, the Indian tribes and their members
possess and use these trust lands, but cannot alienate or encumber
them without federal approval.53 The Supreme Court has described
Indian title as “the right of occupancy with all its beneficial incidents; . . .
the right of occupancy being the primary one and as sacred as the fee.”54
The authority for the United States to hold title in land flows from
Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2 of the Constitution, which provides that
“Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules
and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging
to the United States.”55 The Territory Clause is a fundamental source
of federal authority within the territory defined as “Indian country.”56
This constitutional authority is derived from the federal and tribal
relationship with land, rather than commerce.57
The second basis is precedent. Supreme Court decisions rely on the
Territory Clause as the source of authority for federal criminal laws in
“Indian country.”58 Prior to 1948, “Indian country” was an undefined
term that caused confusion and conflicting decisions. This debate
concluded with three decisions, United States v. Celestine,59 United States
v. Sandoval,60 and United States v. Pelican,61 which all relied on the

52. See, e.g., Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U.S. 517, 525 (1877) (“But the right which
the Indians held was only that of occupancy. The fee was in the United States, subject
to that right, and could be transferred by them whenever they chose.”).
53. See Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574, 597 (1922). This Article uses the
abbreviated term “Indian land” when referring to “trust or restricted land.”
54. United States v. Shoshone Tribe of Indians, 304 U.S. 111, 115 (1938).
55. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
56. See Newton, supra note 18, at 210 n.73.
57. See infra Section III.A.
58. See, e.g., United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278 (1909); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1151
(2012) (defining “Indian country” as all the land within Indian reservations, all
dependent Indian communities, and all Indian allotments).
59. 215 U.S. 278 (1909).
60. 231 U.S. 28 (1913).
61. 232 U.S. 442 (1914).
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Territory Clause. The statutory definition reflects the holdings of these
cases, and nearly verbatim adopts their language.62
While the Supreme Court upheld the statutory definition in 1962 in
Seymour v. Superintendent of Washington State Penitentiary,63 the role of
the Territory Clause in Indian country has gone unnoticed since that
time. Federal territory principles are deeply embedded in federal
Indian law,64 yet, the role of the Territory Clause is rarely recognized.
The role of the Territory Clause lacks attention for several reasons. The
1948 statutory definition brought consistency of interpretation to the
term “Indian country,” but obscured the role of the Territory Clause.65
Congress created the definition during codification of the entirety of Title
18, so its legislative history is limited to a few notes in a much larger
congressional report.66 Additionally, until recently, plenary power
doctrine and broad constructions of the Commerce Clause largely
eliminated the need for courts to consider other sources of federal
authority.67 The renewed focus on strictly construing enumerated powers
requires a fresh look.
Finally, an area of the law may become settled and its history
forgotten. Justice Holmes observed that the law is “eternally weaving
into her web dim figures of the ever-lengthening past.”68 The goal of
this Article is to shine new light on the role of the Territory Clause in
federal Indian law.

62. Compare Celestine 215 U.S. at 285, with § 1151(a) (“All land within the limits of
any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government,
notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running
through the reservation”). Compare Sandoval, 231 U.S. at 46, with § 1151(b) (“[A]ll
dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United States whether within
the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without
the limits of a state”). Compare Pelican, 232 U.S. at 449, with § 1151(c) (“all Indian
allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-ofway running through the same”).
63. 368 U.S. 351 (1962) (referring to § 1151 as the prevailing definition of “Indian
country”).
64. See, e.g., Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959) (understanding that state action may
not infringe on the purposes of an Indian reservation without congressional acquiescence).
65. See Pub. L. No. 80-772, 62 Stat. 757, 757 (1948) (codifying Title 18 and defining
“Indian country”).
66. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012) (citing the legislative history that accompanies
§ 1151); H.R. Rep. No. 308 (1947).
67. See supra notes 18–46 and accompanying text.
68. MAX LERNER, THE MIND AND FAITH OF JUSTICE HOLMES: HIS SPEECHES, ESSAYS,
LETTERS AND JUDICIAL OPINIONS 30 (1943).
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As a result, U.S. history is the third basis for contending that the
Territory Clause is a primary source of authority in Indian affairs.
Today, we think of the Territory Clause for managing the public lands
or for governance of the territorial islands. But none of those existed
in 1787 and the Framers could scarcely have imagined they would.69
The original purpose of the Territory Clause was to govern the vast
area claimed by the United States under the Treaty of Paris of 1783,
most of it held by Indian tribes and known to George Washington and
his military commanders as the “Indian country.”70 A fundamental
purpose of the Constitutional Convention, and the drafting of Article
IV, Section 3 was to create a federal government empowered to
establish new states to the west, to manage relations with the Indian
Nations, and to limit violent conflict in the Indian country.71
The Framers did not believe they owned absolute title to land in Indian
country. Instead, they claimed it as U.S. territory, meaning the United
States had the exclusive right to purchase land from the Indian tribes and
a general power to govern.72 This Article uses the term “Territory Clause”
rather than “Property Clause,” because the concept of territory guided the
Framers and better describes the federal interest in tribal lands.
As settlement stretched westward, the Territory Clause and the
Treaty Clause were the constitutional authorities used for negotiating
the boundaries of lands ceded and reserved by Indian Nations.73

69. See generally Robert B. Keiter, Public Lands and Law Reform: Putting Theory, Policy,
and Practice in Perspective, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 1127, 1131 (2005) (presenting a broad
history of eras of public land policy post-1787).
70. See infra Section I.B (detailing the history of the Territory Clause).
71. See infra Section I.C (describing the debate among the Framers during the
Constitutional Convention that resulted in the drafting of the current Territory Clause).
72. See Felix S. Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 MINN. L. REV. 28, 35, 52 (1947)
(explaining that tribes held absolute title to Indian country “subject only to the
preemption right of purchase acquired by the United States as the successors of Great
Britain” and describing the federal interest acquired in tribal lands as “simply the
power to govern and to tax, the same sort of power that [the federal government]
gained with the acquisition of Puerto Rico or the Virgin Islands a century later”).
European claims to tribal lands were based on the Doctrine of Discovery. See generally
ROBERT MILLER, NATIVE AMERICA, DISCOVERED AND CONQUERED: THOMAS JEFFERSON,
LEWIS AND CLARK, AND MANIFEST DESTINY (2008); LINDSAY ROBERTSON, CONQUEST BY
LAW: HOW THE DISCOVERY OF AMERICA DISPOSSESSED INDIGENOUS PEOPLES OF THEIR
LANDS (2007); Michael Blumm, Retracing the Discovery Doctrine: Aboriginal Title, Tribal
Sovereignty, and Their Significance to Treaty-Making and Modern Natural Resources Policy in
Indian Country, 28 VT. L. REV 713, 718 (2004); Robert Lee, Accounting for Conquest: The
Price of the Louisiana Purchase of Indian Country, 103 J. OF AM. HIST. 921, 922 (2017).
73. See infra Section I.D.
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“From the organization of the National Government, it has been the
rule of the Nation to purchase the occupancy right from the
Indians . . . . The Government has never attempted to survey and
dispose of lands prior to their cession by the Indians.”74 In other words,
the United States could purchase the right of occupancy from Tribal
Nations, but where it did not, those lands remain federal Indian
territory, with the right of occupancy vested in the tribe. Since the
federal government’s founding, it has continually asserted and
assiduously recorded its interest in tribal lands, maintaining millions
of records in the Department of the Interior evidencing both the
federal and tribal interests.75
The limitation on federal title is also a limitation on federal power,
unlike federal public lands. In Kleppe v. New Mexico,76 the Supreme
Court said that “‘[t]he power over the public land thus entrusted to
Congress is without limitations.’”77 Is this another source of absolute
power in Indian country, a more grounded version of plenary power?
No. In contrast, Indian lands are not public lands. The United States
holds tribal lands as a trustee.78
Because of this, the Territory Clause is a deep well of authority
attended by principled limitations as evidenced by its historical
development and adoption in the Constitution. The Territory Clause
can only be understood in the historical context of the Northwest
Ordinance. During the Constitutional Convention, the Framers
needed to resolve the process for the admission of new states and the
governance of the western territory. With the Constitutional Convention
ongoing, the original states agreed to transfer western land claims to

74. THOMAS DONALDSON, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ITS HISTORY, WITH STATISTICS 240 (1884).
75. See infra notes 409–414.
76. 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
77. Id. at 539 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (citing United States v. San
Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29 (1940)).
78. See Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382, 386 n.1 (1939) (“The fee of the
United States is not a dry legal title divorced from substantial powers and
responsibilities with relation to the land.”); United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S.
103, 109–10 (1935) (“The Creek Tribe had a fee simple title, not the usual Indian right
of occupancy with the fee in the United States . . . . The tribe was a dependent Indian
community under the guardianship of the United States, and therefore its property
and affairs were subject to the control and management of that government. But this
power to control and manage was not absolute. While extending to all appropriate
measures for protecting and advancing the tribe, it was subject to limitations inhering
in such a guardianship and to pertinent constitutional restrictions.”).
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the new federal government under the principles in the Northwest
Ordinance:79
The utmost good faith shall always be observed towards the Indians;
their land and property shall never be taken from them without their
consent; and in their property, rights, and liberty, they shall never
be invaded or disturbed, unless in just and lawful wars authorized by
Congress; but laws founded in justice and humanity, shall from time
to time be made for preventing wrongs being done to them, and for
preserving peace and friendship with them.80

The principles of the Northwest Ordinance81 and cession of western
lands were a compact among the original states and all that followed.
This served as the basis for the federal power to govern territory and
create new states in Article IV, Section 3. The First Congress
immediately reenacted the Ordinance in 1789 under the authority of
the Territory Clause, adapting it to the Constitution.82 These provisions
signify the intent of the Framers to govern Indian country. Understood
in its original context, the Territory Clause offers a sturdy basis for
Congress to provide “needful rules and regulations” accompanied by a
duty to respect tribal lands and rights to self-governance.83
Part I of this Article reviews the origins of the Territory Clause: a
story of war, peace, and the struggles of the Continental Congress to
control the western Indian territory acquired from Great Britain.84
Notably, this Part highlights George Washington’s principal role in
developing a policy intended to promote peaceable settlement by
protecting and purchasing tribal land rights.85
79. See infra Sections I.C. and I.E; see also Ordinance of 1787: The Northwest
Territorial Government, reprinted in 1 U.S.C. LVII (2012).
80. 1 U.S.C. LIX.
81. The Ordinance is reprinted in Volume One of the United States Code among
the Organic Laws of the United States along with the Declaration of Independence,
the Articles of Confederation, and the Constitution. See 1 U.S.C. at XLV–LXI. See
generally Denis P. Duffey, The Northwest Ordinance as a Constitutional Document, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 929, 929–68 (1995).
82. The Northwest Ordinance, 1 Stat. 50 (1789).
83. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
84. See generally REGINALD HORSMAN, EXPANSION AND AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY,
1783–1812 4–39 (1967) (discussing the difficulties the first Congress had in developing
and implementing policies to govern Indian territory); Gregory Ablavsky, The Savage
Constitution, 63 DUKE L.J. 999, 1009–38 (2014) (analyzing the creation and ultimate
failure of many early policies attempting to govern Indian territory).
85. See HORSMAN, supra note 84, at 5–6 (addressing George Washington’s plan to
settle members of the Continental Army on the frontier as a method to assure security
and promote land sale); see also Letter from H. Knox, Secretary at War on Indian
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Part II provides a detailed legislative history of the definition of
“Indian country,” demonstrating its roots in the Territory Clause. Part
III reviews the status of federal title in Indian land in the current era
and considers the parallels to other aspects of federal land law. Part
IV acknowledges, and respectfully challenges, the position taken by the
revised editions Handbook of Federal Indian Law.86 Next, Part V considers
some implications of restoring the Territory Clause to its intended role. A
return to understanding the role of the Territory Clause in federal Indian
law may benefit Indian tribes, Congress, and the Court because it makes
certain the source of federal authority and limitations on that power.
This Article closes by drawing some conclusions about the role of
tribal governments within the structure of the Constitution. Tribal
Nations are not “strange sovereigns” to the Constitution, as Professor
Newton concluded.87 Tribal territories were a central part of the Framers’
purpose to promote a peaceful land settlement policy by asserting federal
control and adopting duties to protect tribal rights.88 Indian tribal
governments are inherent sovereigns firmly placed within the original
framework of the Constitution, specifically the Territory Clause.
I. PRESIDENT WASHINGTON AND ORIGINS
OF THE TERRITORY CLAUSE
[A]nd especially as landed matters are often the subject of our
councils with you, a matter of the greatest importance and of general
concern to us, in this case we hold it indispensably necessary that any
cession of our lands should be made in the most public manner, and

Affairs, in 34 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789 124–26 (1788)
(reporting to Congress on national Indian policy). Secretary Knox noted that a
confederation of western Indian tribes opposed settlement of land north of the Ohio
River. Id. at 124. These tribes, he said, “have expressed the highest disgust, at the
principle of conquest, which has been specified to them, as the basis of their treaties
with the United States.” Id. Noting that the British government had always purchased
tribal land, Secretary Knox argued that the United States should adopt the same policy.
Id. at 125. This recommendation became the cornerstone of federal Indian policy.
86. See infra Part IV.
87. See Newton, supra note 18, at 197 (distinguishing the sovereignty of other
foreign nations from the “strange sovereign[ty]” of Indian tribes, which were
ultimately subject to the federal government).
88. Recent historical scholarship emphasizes the outsized role of western Indian lands in
the drive towards the American Revolution and Constitutional Convention. See generally ALAN
TAYLOR, AMERICAN REVOLUTIONS: A CONTINENTAL HISTORY, 1750–1804 (2016) (discussing
how land disputes and territorial expansion were catalysts for the American Revolution).
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by the united voice of the confederacy; holding all partial treaties as
void and of no effect.89

The purpose of the Territory Clause and Article IV, Section 3 was to
settle the debate among the confederated states over the “crown
lands,” those lands reserved for Indian tribes by the Proclamation of
1763 and ceded to the United States at the end of the Revolutionary
War.90 Since the start of the Revolutionary War, the colonies and then
states argued over the disposition of these lands.91 The states without
western land grants greatly resented the claims of the landed states.92
After the war ended, the Continental Army disbanded and the
confederated states faced problems of crippling war debt,
discontented veterans who had not received their pay, and increasingly
violent conflicts with Indian tribes on the western border.93 After
much debate, states began to cede western land claims to the federal
government.94 Although the Northwest Ordinance and planning for new
western states became a central concern for the Continental Congress, the
Articles of Confederation contained no authority for the United States to
hold or regulate territory, acquire and sell lands, or create new states.
At the time of the Constitutional Convention, the United States held
little territory or property other than Indian lands, and was engaged in
fierce wars with Indian tribes along the western frontier caused by landhungry squatters and speculators.95 George Washington and Secretary
of War Henry Knox worked together with many of their Revolutionary
War colleagues, all of whom held land bounties in the West as payment

89. Speech of the United Indian Nations, reprinted in ROBERT ALEXANDER, THE
NORTHWEST ORDINANCE: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS AND THE THEFT OF NATIVE LAND
154, 155 (2017).
90. See Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. 711, 746–47 (1835) (discussing the
Proclamation of 1763 in detail and how it controlled land rights).
91. See GREGORY H. NOBLES, AMERICAN FRONTIERS: CULTURAL ENCOUNTERS AND
CONTINENTAL CONQUEST 87–93 (1997) (describing how the states fought for their own
territorial interests during and immediately after the Revolutionary War).
92. See id. at 92–93 (noting that Maryland, a “land-poor” state, refused to ratify the
Articles of Confederation until states ceded western territory to Congress).
93. See HORSMAN, supra note 84, at 5 (addressing the unanticipated financial
difficulties and underestimated Indian resistance following the Revolutionary War).
94. See NOBLES, supra note 91, at 92–93 (explaining how New York, Connecticut,
and Virginia eventually ceded their lands, and noting how the internal struggle over
territory lasted longer than the Revolutionary War).
95. Id. at 91–96 (describing the continuous struggles the novice American
government had in controlling the frontier).
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for their war service.96 They intended to limit or prevent war in the
“Indian country,” and developed an orderly process of purchasing tribal
lands through treaties.97 Their efforts led to the Northwest Ordinance,
the Territory Clause, and the first Trade and Intercourse Act in 1790.98
Law reviews do not permit maps.
However, the historical
development of the Territory Clause requires an understanding of
three overlapping maps. The first is a map created by centuries of
rivalry between European powers in North America. Long before the
French and Indian War in 1763, European powers claimed most of the
continent along the major water routes.99 The British colonies clung
to the East Coast.100 British colonists were settlers who cleared the land
and displaced Indian tribes with dense agricultural settlements.101 The
French held a far greater territory, though more loosely, from Quebec,
along the St. Lawrence, the Great Lakes, the Mississippi, to
Louisiana.102 The French were traders and trappers and lived more
peacefully alongside Indian people as trading partners, creating
integrated villages.103 The Spanish Empire included Florida, the
Southwest, and the coast of California.104
The second map is more familiar. The thirteen colonies were not
equals, as a matter of territory. Seven “landed” colonies had charters
that reached west indefinitely.105 Virginia was the largest, by far, but
New York, Connecticut, and Massachusetts laid out competing claims
96. See generally HORSMAN, supra note 84, at 5–6 (explaining in detail the roles
Washington and Knox played throughout the development of American Indian Policy).
97. See id. at 5–7 (discussing the initial plan developed by Washington and Knox
to address land settlement and frontier insecurities).
98. See generally id. (outlining the development and implementation of various
United States’ policies surrounding territory and expansion).
99. See CARL UBBELOHDE, THE AMERICAN COLONIES AND THE BRITISH EMPIRE, 1607–
1763 16–17 (John Hope Franklin & Abraham S. Eisenstadt eds., 1968) (describing the
settlement patterns of early Europeans on the North American continent).
100. Id. at 16.
101. Id. at 15–16 (mentioning how developing early British colonies pursued selfsustaining agriculture, tobacco production, and sugar plantations).
102. See id.; see also COLIN G. CALLOWAY, NEW WORLDS FOR ALL: INDIANS, EUROPEANS,
AND THE REMAKING OF EARLY AMERICA 4 (Stanley I. Kutler ed., 2d ed. 2013) (discussing
the interactions the various settlements had with native Indian tribes).
103. See CALLOWAY, supra note 102, at 5 (describing French and Indian settlements
whose cultures frequently merged together).
104. See NOBLES, supra note 91, at 45–46 (addressing Spanish colonialism within
North American).
105. See Merrill Jensen, The Cession of the Old Northwest, 23 MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV.
27, 28 (1964) (noting the debate between “landless” colonies and those with “claims
extending to the South Seas”).
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to Virginia.106 The colonial charters of the Carolinas and Georgia laid
out straight latitudinal lines from the eastern shore to the
Mississippi.107 Six “small” states had defined western borders: New
Hampshire, Rhode Island, New Jersey, Delaware, Pennsylvania, and
Maryland.108 However, after 1783 and British cession of all lands east to
the Mississippi, the thirteen states began a debate over the western
lands.109 All thirteen wanted access, and none had the ability to manage
military and diplomatic relations with the Indian Nations on their own.110
The final map is of the journey of a young George Washington.111
Washington’s first job at age sixteen was as a surveyor of unsettled
Indian lands in the Shenandoah Valley for the Ohio Company of
Virginia.112 Ambitious and adept at appraising value, by age twenty,
Washington had laid out many land claims.113 He bought and sold his
way into nearly 2500 acres of prime land, much of it in Indian
country.114 At twenty-one, Washington first traveled to the headwaters
of the Ohio River and viewed its gateway into the fertile Midwest.115
Washington was in the service of the Virginia colony’s Lieutenant
Governor Robert Dinwiddie, who was both an investor in, and

106. See NOBLES, supra note 91, at 92.
107. See 2 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER
ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 765, 770–71 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909)
(reprinting the Charter of Georgia establishing the territory boundaries); 5 THE FEDERAL
AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES,
TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 2743–44 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909) (reprinting the Charter of
Carolina expressing the western boundary as extending “as far as the south seas”).
108. See ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT:
THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST 246 (1990) (describing these as the “landless” colonies).
109. See NOBLES, supra note 91, at 91–94 (addressing some of the various disputes
between states leading up to the Northwest Ordinance).
110. See generally HORSMAN, supra note 84, at 5–15 (dissecting the various difficulties
the new government faced managing new territory and developing a federal Indian
policy following American independence).
111. See generally JOHN FERLING, THE ASCENT OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: THE HIDDEN
POLITICAL GENIUS OF AN AMERICAN ICON 12–13 (2009) (discussing the various journeys
George Washington took throughout his career).
112. Id. at 12.
113. Id. at 13.
114. Id.
115. THE JOURNAL OF MAJOR GEORGE WASHINGTON: AN ACCOUNT OF HIS FIRST
OFFICIAL MISSION, MADE AS EMISSARY FROM THE GOVERNOR OF VIRGINIA TO THE
COMMANDANT OF THE FRENCH FORCES ON THE OHIO, OCT. 1753–JAN. 1754 v–vii (1959)
(illustrating a map of Washington’s journey).
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supervising official for, the Ohio Company of Virginia.116 Dinwiddie’s
goal was to assert British claims to the Ohio Valley and order the
French to cease building a string of forts to defend their competing
claims.117 Washington returned with a defiant answer from the French,
and a vision for settlement in the Ohio Valley.118 Military leadership
and speculation in Indian land would combine in ways that defined
the remainder of Washington’s life in public service.
These three maps are a starting point for understanding European
settlement in North America, but they began to transform rapidly with
the advent of the French and Indian War in 1754, and again with the
Revolutionary War in 1775. They provide the backdrop for the United
States acquisition of its western territory in 1783, and the original
purpose of the Territory Clause to govern the Indian country.
A.

The French and Indian War and the Proclamation of 1763

Washington started the French and Indian War in May of 1754,
intending to halt the French invasion of Virginia’s western lands as
established by royal charter.119 Virginia militiamen and tribal allies
from the Seneca, and others of the Six Nations Iroquois, ambushed a
French patrol in a conflict over Fort Duquesne, near what is now
Pittsburgh.120 They were under the command of a twenty-two-year-old
Washington and the Seneca Half King Tanaghrisson.121 The war
exploded into an intercontinental conflict, known to Europeans as the
Seven Years War, between the French and British and their respective
116. Id. at 3.
117. Letter from Robert Dinwiddie to the Commandant of the French Forces on
the Ohio, reprinted in THE JOURNAL OF MAJOR GEORGE WASHINGTON 25–26 (1959).
118. Letter from Legardeur de St. Piere to Robert Dinwiddie, reprinted in THE
JOURNAL OF MAJOR GEORGE WASHINGTON 27–28 (1959) (translating the letter the
French forces sent in response).
119. See THE JOURNAL OF MAJOR GEORGE WASHINGTON: AN ACCOUNT OF HIS FIRST
OFFICIAL MISSION, MADE AS EMISSARY FROM THE GOVERNOR OF VIRGINIA TO THE
COMMANDANT OF THE FRENCH FORCES ON THE OHIO, OCT. 1753–JAN. 1754 25–26 (1959).
The letter from Virginia’s Governor Dinwiddie to the French Commander stated in
part that “[t]he Lands upon the River Ohio, in the Western Parts of the Colony of
Virginia, are so notoriously known to be the Property of the Crown of Great-Britain,
that it is a Matter of equal Concern & Surprize [sic] to me, to hear that a Body of
French Forces are erecting Fortresses, & making Settlements upon that River, within
his Majesty’s Dominions.” Id.
120. See Letter from George Washington to Robert Dinwiddie, 29 May 1754,
FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/02-01-020054 (last visited Oct. 17, 2018).
121. Id.
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allies.122 The frontier war in America provided Washington with
experiences that shaped his future Indian policy and exposed him to
the realities of the Indian territory while leading and negotiating with
experienced Native military commanders.123
The end of the French and Indian War consolidated British control
as France gave up its territories in North America.124 It also started a
chain of events that proved disastrous for Tribal Nations. Previously,
British colonies had clung to the eastern seaboard, while French
settlements were concentrated along the St. Lawrence River Valley and
the Great Lakes.125 After the war, Indian tribes could no longer use the
French and British competition over the fur trade to preserve their
lands.126 Colonists poured into the Indian territory, causing Chief
Pontiac’s confederation of tribes to rise up and kill hundreds of settlers.127
The British Crown wanted to avoid further war with Indian tribes.128
Accordingly, King George III issued the Proclamation of 1763 soon
after the end of the French and Indian War.129 The text of the

122. NOBLES, supra note 91, at 82.
123. Washington and the French & Indian War, GEORGE WASHINGTON’S MOUNT VERNON,
http://www.mountvernon.org/george-washington/french-indian-war/washington-andthe-french-indian-war (last visited Oct. 17, 2018).
124. NOBLES, supra note 91, at 116.
125. UBBELOHDE, supra note 99, at 16.
126. See generally William A. Starna & Jose Antonio Brandao, From the MohawkMahican War to the Beaver Wars: Questioning the Pattern, 51 ETHNOHISTORY 725 (2004).
127. See NOBLES, supra note 91, at 84–86 (explaining that as soon as the British signed the
Treaty of Paris, they were confronted with a series of frontier uprisings); see also DOCUMENTS OF
UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY 9–15 (Francis Paul Prucha ed., 3d ed. 2000) (demonstrating
through letters and reports how violence between settlers and Indians escalated).
128. Proclamation Line of 1763, GEORGE WASHINGTON’S MOUNT VERNON,
https://www.mountvernon.org/library/digitalhistory/digitalencyclopedia/article/proclamation-line-of-1763 (last visited Oct. 17, 2018) (discussing
the numerous sociopolitical and economic reasons behind why the British Crown
wanted to limit westward expansion).
129. KING GEORGE III, ROYAL PROCLAMATION OF 1763 (1763); see also Proclamation
Line of 1763, GEORGE WASHINGTON’S MOUNT VERNON, https://www.mountvernon.
org/library/digitalhistory/digital-encyclopedia/article/nproclamation-line-of-1763
(last visited Oct. 17, 2018) (prohibiting colonists from settling on lands acquired after
the end of the Seven Years’ War). Johnson v. M’Intosh cites the Proclamation as the
source of all federal Indian territory, and it is a cornerstone of the law in both the
United States and Canada. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 594, 596–97 (1823). The
Proclamation is referenced in Section 25 of the Constitution Act of 1982, which
preserved the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in the Canadian Constitution and
finalized Canadian independence from Britain. See Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.).
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Proclamation is often mischaracterized.130 The Proclamation did not
simply prohibit colonial settlement beyond the Appalachians.131
Instead, it was a comprehensive policy and the first expression of three
legal principles: (1) the right of preemption over all tribal lands, to be
purchased with tribal consent and the Crown’s approval; (2) the
regulation of trade to prevent fraud and unfair practices that caused
conflict; and (3) the imposition of provisions to address the flight of
criminals and prevent violence towards Indians.132 These principles
were later incorporated into the Northwest Ordinance, the
Constitution, and the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790.133
B.

The Revolutionary War and State Cessions of Western Indian Territory

The Proclamation’s effort to manage frontier policy and protect the
interests of Indian tribes contributed directly to the Revolutionary
War.134 Colonial governments and settlers resented the restriction on
their rights to westward expansion.135
Land speculators, like
Washington and many of the Founders, begrudged the interference
with their land in the Ohio Valley.136 In 1767, Washington ordered his
land agent to continue securing land from the newly acquired territory,
believing that the Proclamation was only a “temporary expedient” used
to pacify the Indian tribes and would have no lasting impact.137

130. Royal Proclamation of 1763, 3 Geo. 3 (U.K.).
131. Id. (outlining Great Britain’s plan to control the settlement of newly acquired
land following the Seven Years’ War).
132. See id. (imposing a number of regulations regarding the settlement of colonists
on newly acquired territory and their interactions with Indian tribes).
133. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; id. art. IV, § 3 (granting Congress the power to govern
territories and regulate trade with Indian tribes); An Ordinance for the Government
of the Territory of the United States North West of the River of Ohio, reprinted in 32
JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789 340–41 (1905) (asserting in
Article 3 of the Northwest Ordinance that the property rights and liberty of Indians
shall not be “invaded or disturbed”); DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY,
supra note 127, at 14–15 (reprinting the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790
which strictly regulated trade and land sale between settlers and Indians).
134. See generally COLIN G. CALLOWAY, THE SCRATCH OF A PEN: 1763 AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF NORTH AMERICA (2006) (discussing how policies and events served
as catalysts for American independence).
135. See id. at 98 (noting how the Proclamation failed to prevent colonial settlement
onto Indian lands).
136. Id. at 98–99.
137. Letter from George Washington to William Crawford, 17 September 1767,
FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/02-08-020020 (last visited Oct. 17, 2018).
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The Quebec Act of 1774,138 one of the “Intolerable Acts,”139 dashed
Washington’s hopes for riches from western lands, as it purported to
transfer the northwest Indian territory to the Province of Quebec
despite the land grants in the colonial charters.140 However, those
dashed hopes turned into new resolve. The Declaration of
Independence lists both the Proclamation and the Quebec Act as
grievances that required American independence.141
During the Revolutionary War, General Washington soon found
himself in a position similar to King George with respect to Indian
affairs. Freed from the restrictions of the Proclamation, settlers and land
speculators moved into the western regions and conflicts with Indians
increased.142 States like Virginia attempted to limit westward expansion
through laws requiring state consent.143 Thomas Jefferson noted the
futility in 1776: “They will settle the lands in spite of everybody.”144
The landed states’ claims to the “western lands” soon became a
matter of intense controversy among the thirteen colonies.145 The
seven landed states laid out conflicting claims and wanted the western
lands for their own citizens and for the value of land sales.146 The other
six states felt strongly that the western lands should be shared among

138. The Quebec Act, 1774, 14 Geo. 3 c. 83 (Eng.).
139. See Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to the Articles of Confederation as a Source for
Determining the Original Meaning of the Constitution, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 397, 401–02
(explaining the “Intolerable Acts” as the series of five punitive acts passed by British
Parliament following the rebellious “Boston Tea Party” protest).
140. See The Quebec Act, § 1 (detailing the boundaries of the land given to Quebec).
141. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 9, 22 (U.S. 1776) (listing the
abuses King George III took against the colonies, including “raising the conditions of
new Appropriations of Lands” and “abolishing the free System of English Laws in a
neighbouring Province, establishing therein an Arbitrary government, and enlarging
its Boundaries so as to render it at once an example and fit instrument for introducing
the same absolute rule into these Colonies”).
142. COLIN G. CALLOWAY, THE INDIAN WORLD OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 193–94, 278–79
(2018) (describing the various violent clashes between Indians and settlers pushing westward).
143. See Merrill Jensen, The Cession of the Old Northwest, 23 MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV.
27, 30–31 (1964) (noting that the Virginia state constitution required consent of the
Virginia Legislature for any western land purchases within the charter limits).
144. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Pendleton, 13 August 1776, FOUNDERS
ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-01-02-0205 (last visited
Oct. 17, 2018).
145. See Reginald Horsman, The Northwest Ordinance and the Shaping of an Expanding
Republic, 73 WIS. MAG. HIST. 21, 22 (1989) (highlighting how Maryland’s refusal to sign
the Articles of Confederation brought the western land issue back to the surface).
146. Id.
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the entire country.147 They were concerned about losing influence to
larger states, wanted their own citizens to have access, and needed the
funds from western land sales to pay debts from the war.148
Maryland led the effort among the small states, and refused to ratify
the Articles of Confederation.149 Maryland made three arguments in
support of the motion to cede western land claims and form new states
to the west. First, the landed states’ conflicting claims would tear the
new United States apart.150 This concern was founded in the violent
conflicts between Pennsylvania and Connecticut over the Wyoming
Valley region, present day Scranton.151 Maryland reasoned that if all
the states benefitted from the settlement of western lands, the lands
would create bonds of common interest in fighting the war.152 Second,
Maryland contended that funds from sales of western lands should pay
the enormous war debt collectively.153 Third, Maryland was unwilling
to join the United States if the landed states could create vassal states,
and insisted that new states be admitted as equal sovereigns.154
Then financial and military pressures mounted. The Continental
Army needed funding, and land speculation companies offered funds
for clear title to western lands.155 Conflicts with Indian tribes
increased.156 In the spring of 1780, the British army began raiding in
Virginia, an immediate threat.157 The French minister to the United
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Horsman, supra note 145, at 36–37.
150. DONALDSON, supra note 74, at 61.
151. See Anne M. Ousterhout, Frontier Vengeance: Connecticut Yankees vs. Pennamites
in the Wyoming Valley, 62 PA. HIST. 330, 336–37 (1995) (noting that the Wyoming
massacre was one of the bloodiest battles of the Revolutionary War).
152. Jerry A. O’Callaghan, The Western Lands, 1776–84: Catalyst for Nationhood, 31 J.
FOREST HIST. 133, 135 (1987) (describing how Maryland intended to use the western
lands as an incentive for soldiers to join the war effort).
153. Id.
154. See DONALDSON, supra note 74, at 61–62 (arguing that powerful landed states
could create a sub-confederacy of submissive landless states); see also HERBERT B.
ADAMS, MARYLAND’S INFLUENCE UPON LAND CESSIONS TO THE UNITED STATES 35 (1885)
(explaining that Maryland’s vision for the west was destined to prevail).
155. See O’Callaghan, supra note 152, at 134 (describing the how the Continental
Army used land bounties to pay soldiers).
156. John Butler, New Sources on the Sullivan-Clinton Campaign in 1779, 10 Q.J. N.Y.
ST. HIST. ASS’N 185, 186 (1929).
157. St. George L. Sioussat, The Chevalier de la Luzerne and the Ratification of the Articles of
Confederation by Maryland, 1780–1781, With Accompanying Documents, 60 PA. MAG. OF HIST. &
BIOGRAPHY 391, 392 (1936) (noting that Virginia’s governor appealed to Congress for help as
the continental army struggled to defend the Chesapeake Bay and its tributary rivers).
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States made clear that France would supply ships and soldiers if the
States would ratify the Articles of Confederation.158 In response to
these pressures, and at the insistence of Maryland, the Continental
Congress agreed in principle that the landed states would cede their
claims and form new states to the west.159
New York was the first to cede land to the central government with
an explicit disclaimer to all tribal lands of the “Six Nations, and their
tributaries.”160 The very first “territory” ceded to the United States was
Indian territory, which demonstrated the need for national
authority—an authority that did not exist in the Articles of
Confederation. The New York cession became effective on March 1,
1781 and Maryland ratified the Articles of Confederation on the same
day.161 In response, the French sent thousands of troops and the
British surrendered at the Battle of Yorktown six months later.162
The Revolutionary War ended with the Treaty of Paris on September
3, 1783, setting the western boundary of the United States at the
Mississippi River.163 The Continental Congress issued three sets of
instructions to the negotiators—John Adams, Ben Franklin, and John
Jay—leaving no doubt that the primary goal of their negotiations was
to gain possession of western tribal territory.164 The first instruction,
in August of 1779, demanded “clear and indisputable [b]oundaries”
by a line drawn “[s]traight to the [s]ource of the River Mississippi.”165
In October of 1780, the second set of instructions addressed Britain’s
contention that it had no power to grant title to tribal lands, countering
that the Proclamation of 1763 expressly declared that the western lands

158. See id. (detailing the impact of land speculators and the politics that led to the
western land cessions); see also Merrill Jensen, The Creation of the National Domain, 1781–
1784, 26 MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. 323, 330 (1939).
159. See Motion Regarding the Western Lands, (Sept. 6, 1780), in 2 THE PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON, 72, 77–78 (William T. Hutchinson & William M. E. Rachal eds., 1962) (approving
Virginia, North Carolina, and Georgia’s cession of western land for future states).
160. 4 JOURNALS OF THE AMERICAN CONGRESS: FROM 1774 TO 1788 21–22 (1823).
161. An Act to Facilitate the Completion of the Articles of Confederation and
Perpetual Union Among the United States of America (Mar. 1, 1781), in 19 JOURNALS
OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, 211, 213–14 (1912).
162. RONALD L. HEINEMANN ET AL., OLD DOMINION, NEW COMMONWEALTH: A
HISTORY OF VIRGINIA, 1607–2007 131 (2007).
163. Treaty of Peace, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. II, Sept. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 80.
164. A Draft of Instructions to be Appointed to Negotiate a Treaty of Peace with
Great Britain (Aug. 14, 1779), in 14 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–
1789 956, 956–58 (1909).
165. Id. at 958.
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“were within the sovereignty and dominion of that crown,
notwithstanding the reservation of them to the use of the Indians.”166
The third set of instructions, dated August 20, 1782, was a forty-page
legal argument about the territorial rights of the thirteen states,
reciting the boundaries set by colonial land grants, charters, royal
commissions, and treaty cessions.167 It cited the treaty ending the
French and Indian War as the authority for the colonies to expand
outward to the Mississippi River.”168 The instructions again seized on
the Proclamation of 1763 as evidence of their claim: “In a word, this
part of the proclamation seems to have been intended merely to shut
up the land offices, not to curtail limits; to keep the Indians in peace,
not to relinquish the rights accruing under the charters, and
particularly that of pre-emption.”169 The instructions expressed
confidence that the western territories were the property of the United
States and could be used to pay war debts.170
The Revolutionary War had much to do with the American desire to
control the West, a desire that only increased during the conflict.171
Historian William Hogeland stated, “American independence without
the American West wouldn’t be American independence at all.
Ceding the great region that Britain had long been struggling to
reserve for Indians wasn’t generous but a sine qua non of peace.”172
In the euphoria of victory, even more settlers and land speculators
flooded west, while the states debated the terms of further western land
cessions.173 On September 23, 1783, Washington wrote to his Chief of
Artillery, Knox, and drew his attention to the need for states cessions
of western Indian lands:

166. Draft of Letter to John Jay, Explaining His Instructions, [17 October] 1780,
FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-02-02-0080 (last
visited Oct. 17, 2018).
167. Committee Report for Negotiating a Treaty of Peace (Aug. 20, 1782), in 23
JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789 471–74 (1914).
168. Id. at 473–74.
169. Id. at 475.
170. Id. at 517.
171. WILLIAM HOGELAND, AUTUMN OF THE BLACK SNAKE: THE CREATION OF THE U.S.
ARMY AND THE INVASION THAT OPENED THE WEST 92–93 (2017) (explaining that the U.S.
and England were always going to fight over the expansion into western territory).
172. Id. at 92–93.
173. PAUL B. MOYER, WILD YANKEES: THE STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE ALONG
PENNSYLVANIA’S REVOLUTIONARY FRONTIER 97 (2007) (noting that America’s merchants
and economic elite focused on land speculation and western expansion over
traditional commerce).
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I have laboured since, & I hope not unsuccessfully, to convince the
Members of Congress that while the United States and the State of
Virginia are disputing about the right, or the terms of the Cession,
Land jobbers and a lawless Banditti who would bid defiance to the
Authority of either & more than probably involve this Country in an
Indian War . . . .174

When Washington left military service in 1783, his first action as a
private citizen was to visit his extensive land holdings in western New
York, Pennsylvania, and what became Ohio and Kentucky.175
Washington spent thirty-four days traveling by horseback and
discovered three things.176 First, squatters occupied his land and defied his
ownership.177 Second, western settlers were drifting towards allegiances
with the British and Spanish who controlled trade along the Great Lakes
and the Mississippi River.178 Third, American relocation to the West was
creating extreme hostilities with Indian tribes.179 Ultimately, Washington
cut his trip short because of threats of violence from Indian tribes whose
lands were under assault from unchecked western migration.180
After returning from his western travels, Washington put a great deal
of political effort into convincing the states to cede control over Indian
territory to the federal government.181 Knox soon became Secretary of
War to the Continental Congress, which at that time was the highestranking political position in the United States.182 Eventually Virginia ceded
its western territory in 1784183 and was quickly followed by Massachusetts184

174. Letter from George Washington to Henry Knox, 23 September 1783,
FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-0211847 (last visited Oct. 17, 2018).
175. W. W. Abbot, George Washington, the West, and the Union, 84 IND. MAG. HIST. 3,
8–10 (1988).
176. Id. at 10.
177. See Ablavsky, supra note 84, at 1018. Washington “found the ‘rage’ for land
speculation unabated.” Id.
178. Abbot, supra note 175, at 11.
179. Ablavsky, supra note 84, at 1017.
180. JOHN E. FERLING, THE ASCENT OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: THE HIDDEN POLITICAL
GENIUS OF AN AMERICAN ICON 247–50 (2009).
181. Reginald Horsman, American Indian Policy in the Old Northwest, 1783–1812, 18
WM. & MARY Q. 35, 36–37 (1961).
182. ROBERT M. S. MCDONALD, SONS OF THE FATHER: GEORGE WASHINGTON AND HIS
PROTÉGÉS 140 (2013).
183. Deed of Cession as Executed (Mar. 1, 1784), in 6 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 577, 577–80 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1952).
184. Massachusetts Deed of Cession (Apr. 19, 1785), in 28 JOURNALS OF THE
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789 279, 280–82 (1933).
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and Connecticut,185 all ceding their claims to “territory.” This set the stage
for the Northwest Ordinance, and eventually a new Constitution.
C.

Development of the Northwest Ordinance

At first view, it may seem a little extraneous, when I am called upon
to give an opinion upon the terms of a Peace proper to be made with
the Indians, that I should go into the formation of New States; but
the Settlement of the Western Country and making a Peace with the
Indians are so analogous that there can be no definition of the one
without involving considerations of the other. [F]or I repeat it,
again, and I am clear in my opinion, that policy and economy point
very strongly to the expediency of being upon good terms with the
Indians, and the propriety of purchasing their Lands in preference
to attempting to drive them by force of arms out of their Country.
—George Washington186

While Washington did not write the Northwest Ordinance, he and
his military colleagues propelled it into existence.187 The push for a
new state in the Ohio Valley began near the end of the Revolutionary
War, beginning as a petition from the officers of the Continental
Army.188 Unpaid and embarrassed by their poverty, 285 officers signed
a letter urging Congress to buy land in the Ohio Valley from the Indian
tribes, deliver their promised land bounties, and form a distinct
government “to be admitted as one of the confederated States of
America.”189 Seven of the signatories were Generals—including Knox
and Rufus Putnam.190 Washington forwarded this plan to Congress:
“[T]he appearance of so formidable a Settlement in the vicinity of
their Towns (to say nothing of the barrier it would form against our
other Neighbours) would be the most likely means to enable us to
185. Connecticut Deed of Cession (Sept. 14, 1786), in 31 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS, 1774–1789 653, 654–55 (1934).
186. Letter from George Washington to James Duane, 7 September
1783, FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/9901-02-11798 (last visited Oct. 17, 2018).
187. Denis P. Duffey, The Northwest Ordinance as a Constitutional Document, 95 COLUM.
L. REV. 929, 936–37 (1995).
188. Timothy J. Shannon, The Ohio Company and the Meaning of Opportunity in the
American West, 1786–1795, 64 NEW ENG. Q. 393, 395 (1991).
189. The Petition of the Subscribers, Officers in the Continental Line of the Army
(June 16, 1783), in 1 LIFE JOURNALS AND CORRESPONDENCE OF REV. MANASSEH CUTLER
159, 159–60 (William Parker Cutler & Julia Perkins Cutler eds., 1888).
190. Id. at 160–67. Putnam was the promotor, and wrote a detailed plan for
settlement that included peaceful relations with Indian tribes. Id. at 167–72.
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purchase upon equitable terms of the Aborigines their right of
[preoccupancy and to] induce them to relinquish our Territories, and
to remove into the illimitable regions of the West.”191
Putnam pressed Washington to ensure Congress approved the
officers’ petition.192 Washington responded that he “exerted every
power [he] was master of” yet was not optimistic for a speedy
response.193 Instead, Jefferson led the early congressional efforts to
plan for the western territories.194 Fresh from a victory, the United
States was not inclined to respect tribal rights to land and military
strength.195 The United States attempted to dictate treaties on
exclusively American terms, intimidating some tribal leaders into
signing without authority from their larger tribal government
bodies.196 However, Congress disbanded the Continental Army, and
the tribes did not intend to withdraw from their lands.197 They soon
renounced the treaties and the Northwest Indian War followed.198
Although Congress adopted an early version of the Northwest
Ordinance in 1784, it was never effective because it failed to account
for Indian rights.199 Indian Nations grew increasingly hostile to
encroachment on their lands, while British posts along the Great Lakes
supplied trade goods and weapons.200
Congress appointed Knox Secretary of War in 1785, with 500 soldiers
guarding the entire western frontier.201 Large groups of southern
191. Letter from George Washington to Elias Boudinot, 17 June 1783, FOUNDERS
ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-11469 (last
visited Oct. 17, 2018).
192. Letter to George Washington from Rufus Putnam, 16 June 1783, FOUNDERS
ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-11466 (last
visited Oct. 17, 2018).
193. Letter from George Washington to Rufus Putnam, 2 June 1784, FOUNDERS
ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/04-01-02-0286 (last
visited Oct. 17, 2018).
194. Duffey, supra note 187, at 935.
195. Report on Indian Affairs in the Southern Department (May 28, 1784), in 27
JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789 456 (1928).
196. HORSMAN, supra note 84, at 16–24.
197. Horsman, supra note 181, at 39–40.
198. Id. at 42–44.
199. See generally Report on a Plan for a Temporary Government of the Western
Territory (Apr. 23, 1784), in 26 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789
274, 275–79 (1928) (highlighting the growing concern over Indian Nations and the
British presence in the west).
200. See J. LEITCH WRIGHT JR., BRITAIN AND THE AMERICAN FRONTIER, 1783–1815 30 (1975).
201. See Election of a Secretary at War (Mar. 8, 1785), in 28 JOURNALS OF THE
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789 129, 129 (1933); see also Report of the Secretary at
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Indians led by Dragging Canoe and Alexander McGillivray organized.202
The frontier exploded with violence against settlers and state militias
attempting to protect them.203 Knox soon raised an alarm with Congress
through a series of reports, in which he proposed to reset national
Indian policy, pay for voluntary Indian land cessions, regulate trade,
and maintain a sufficient military force to keep the peace and restrain
settlers who committed crimes against Indians.204 However, the
Continental Congress lacked the authority to respond.205 In August of
1786, even before Shays’ Rebellion, Washington wrote to Jay
expressing concern that the Union would be unable to survive without
a stronger centralized government.206 American efforts at imperialism
sparked a military backlash from Indian Nations.207
By the end of 1786, the Indian tribes formed a confederacy with
regular council meetings and a commitment to stop American
settlements north of the Ohio River.208 This new union of Indian
Nations met at Fort Detroit under British protection, adding
considerably to its collective power.209 The Five Nations of the
Iroquois, as well as Huron, Delaware, Shawnee, Ottawa, Chippewa,
Pottawatomi, Miami, Cherokees and the Wabash Confederated, sent a
unified demand to Congress. They demanded that the Ohio River be
the permanent boundary with the United States, that land surveyors be
prohibited from crossing the Ohio River, that “partial Treaties” were
void, and that all treaties and land negotiations must be with the
confederacy as a whole.210

War on Indian Hostilities (July 10, 1787), in 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS, 1774–1789 327, 328 (1936).
202. Ablavsky, supra note 84, at 1028–31.
203. Id. at 1017, 1039. Conflicts over land triggered cycles of violence. Indians “killed
or captured as many as three thousand Anglo-Americans between 1783 and 1790—twothirds as many as had died fighting in the Revolution.” Id. at 1039.
204. Id. at 1026–27.
205. Id.
206. Letter from George Washington to John Jay, 15 August 1786, FOUNDERS ONLINE,
https://founders.archives.gov/GEWN-04-04-02-0199 (last visited Oct. 17, 2018).
207. Horsman, supra note 181, at 339–40 (detailing how the U.S. Indian policy
backfired in the Ohio Territory in part due to unfair treaty practices).
208. R. DOUGLAS HURT, THE OHIO FRONTIER: CRUCIBLE OF THE OLD NORTHWEST,
1720–1830 100 (1996).
209. Id. at 100–01.
210. Henry Knox, Speech of the United Indian Nations at their Confederate Council
(July 10, 1787), in PAPERS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 327–32.
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In December 1786, Washington and Knox began to correspond
about the need for a strong national government.211 Washington wrote
that Great Britain “is at this moment sowing the Seeds of jealousy &
discontent among the various tribes of Indians on our frontier . . . she
will improve every opportunity to foment the spirit of turbulence
within the bowels of the United States.”212 Knox responded in January
of 1787, urging Washington to attend the Constitutional Convention,
and laying out his famous sketch for a strong federal government “of
the least possible powers.”213 Indian lands were central to the concerns
of the Framers from the beginning.
Putnam renewed his efforts to claim military land bounties and settle
the Ohio Valley.214 He and two other generals formed the Ohio
Company, and in July 1787 sent Manasseh Cutler to New York to negotiate
for the purchase of land, offering millions to the insolvent Continental
Congress.215 These were veteran officers who had experienced the
French and Indian War and intended to settle in the Ohio Valley.216 One
of their principle terms of negotiation was a demand for an Indian peace
policy in a revised Northwest Ordinance.217
On July 10, 1787, Knox returned from a visit with Washington in
Philadelphia, and submitted another alarming report to Congress
about continued Indian hostilities:218
And the whole western territory is liable to be wrested out of the
hands of the Union by lawless adventurers, or by the savages . . . [i]n
the present embarrassed state of public affairs and entire deficiency

211. Letter from George Washington to Henry Knox, 26 December 1786, FOUNDERS
ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/04-04-02-0409 (last
visited Oct. 17, 2018).
212. Id.
213. Letter to George Washington from Henry Knox, 14 January 1787, FOUNDERS
ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/04-04-02-0444 (last
visited Oct. 17, 2018).
214. Shannon, supra note 188, at 396.
215. Id. at 396, 402.
216. Id. at 396–97.
217. Letter to Nathan Dane (Mar. 16, 1787), in LIFE JOURNALS AND CORRESPONDENCE
OF REV. MANASSEH CUTLER, LL.D. 193, 193–94 (William Parker Cutler & Julia Perkins
Cutler eds., 1888) (requesting a change in Indian policy to remove instability in the
region and improve economic opportunity).
218. See Letter to George Washington from Henry Knox, 29 May 1787, FOUNDERS
ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/04-05-02-0185 (last
visited Oct. 17, 2018).
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of funds an [I]ndian war of any considerable extent and duration
would most exceedingly distress the United States.219

His report threatened great loss of revenue from western land sales
and development.220 The next day, the first reading of the Northwest
Ordinance appears in the Journals of the Continental Congress, with
its pledge of utmost good faith towards the Indians and their lands.221
Washington was deeply involved in the development of the
Northwest Ordinance.222 In early July 1787, a significant political shift
brought finality to the Ordinance of 1787.223 Members of Congress
who were also participating in the Convention began to travel from
Philadelphia to New York.224 With Federalists now in the majority,
Richard Henry Lee, Edward Carrington, John Kean, Melancton Smith,
and Nathan Dane were appointed to a new drafting committee, which
quickly produced the Northwest Ordinance.225 Edward Carrington
served as chair,226 and had served under both Washington and Knox
in the artillery at Yorktown.227
With his military colleagues in control of advising Congress on
Indian policy, purchasing the first large settlement in the Ohio Valley,
and the drafting committee, the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 closely
resembles Washington’s 1783 plan: purchase of tribal lands through
treaty, settlements under federal control, and an orderly process for
admission of new states.228
219. Report of the Secretary at War on Indian Hostilities (July 10, 1787), in 32
JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789 327, 331 (1936).
220. Id. at 329.
221. Id. at 340; see also HOGELAND, supra note 171, at 124 (“Informally he’d advised
Members of the Congress on Indian policy and evaluated details of the relevant
Northwest Ordinances, and given his immense prestige and expertise, informally
usually meant decisively.”).
222. HOGELAND, supra note 171, at 124.
223. ROBERT ALEXANDER, THE NORTHWEST ORDINANCE: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS
AND THE THEFT OF NATIVE LAND 88 (2017).
224. Id. at 86–87.
225. Id. at 87.
226. Willian Frederick Poole, Dr. Cutler and the Ordinance of 1787, 122 N. AM. REV.
229, 245 (1876).
227. William W. Reynolds, The American Gunners at Yorktown, J. AM. REVOLUTION
(May 9, 2017), https://allthingsliberty.com/2017/05/american-gunners-yorktown.
228. Compare An Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United States
North West of the River of Ohio, reprinted in 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS,
1774–1789 334–43 (1905) (providing a plan that allows Washington’s military colleagues
to advise Congress on Indian policy and purchase the first large settlement in the Ohio
Valley), with DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY, supra note 127, at 1–4
(containing documents outlining and implementing Washington’s plan for Indian affairs).
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History and Structure Demonstrate the Indian Country Purpose of the
Territory Clause
The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful
rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property
belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution
shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims of the United States,
or of any particular state.229

Washington pressed forward with his plan for Indian affairs and western
lands during the Constitutional Convention. He attended as a delegate from
Virginia,230 and was elected unanimously as president of the Convention.231
The Indian wars and western territories were not the only purpose of
the Constitutional Convention, but fit into the fundamental structure of
financial, military, and territorial reasons for a strong federal
government.232 Underlying Shays’ Rebellion was the discontent of
veterans who were receiving neither the pay for their service nor the
land bounties promised in the west.233 The rebellion called into
question the financial condition of the United States and the ability to
secure the western lands.234 Washington had vast experience in the

229. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
230. Virginia Delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1787, ENCYCLOPEDIA VIRGINIA,
http://www.EncyclopediaVirginia.org/Virginia_Delegates_to_the_Constitutional_Co
nvention_of_1787 (last visited Oct. 17, 2018) (stating that the Constitutional
Convention occurred from May 14, 1787 to September 17, 1787).
231. DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY, supra note 127, at 1 (outlining the
principles that Washington planned that eventually formed the basis for the Indian policy of the
Continental Congress); William P. Kladky, Constitutional Convention, GEORGE WASHINGTON’S
MOUNT VERNON, https://www.mountvernon.org/library/digitalhistory/digital-encyclopedia/
article/constitutional-convention.
232. See The Constitution: An Enduring Document, in Outline of the U.S. Government 4,
U.S. DEP’T. OF STATE, https://photos.state.gov/libraries/amgov/30145/publications-english/
1310_Outline_of_US_Government_English_TEXT_Low_WEB.pdf (providing that the
Constitutional Convention’s delegates aimed to construct a more centralized government to
remedy the Articles of Confederation’s inability to collect taxes, force states to contribute troops
or equipment, or enforce decisions of state disputes over boundaries).
233. Rahul Tilva, Shays’ Rebellion, GEORGE WASHINGTON’S MOUNT VERNON,
http://www.mountvernon.org/digital-encyclopedia/article/shays-rebellion. Shays’
Rebellion was a result of the monetary debt crisis after the American Revolutionary
War. Id. Daniel Shays led a violent uprising against debt collections in Massachusetts
that highlighted the inherent weaknesses of the national government under the
Articles of Confederation. Id.
234. See id. (describing how the rebellion cast doubt on the state of the new
country’s finances and raised issues about the weak governmental structure under the
Articles of Confederation).
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western lands,235 his contemporaries recognized the weight of his
influence,236 and his support among military veterans was nearly
complete.237 The Territory Clause was the capstone to Washington’s
plan for western Indian lands and the admission of new states.
There are four reasons to postulate that the Territory Clause was
originally intended to include Indian lands. First, Indian lands were
expressly included within the territorial boundaries established by the
Treaty of Paris.238 The Continental Congress insisted on including the
tribal lands protected by the Proclamation of 1763, so there can be no
doubt that the Framers considered these boundaries to be
“territory . . . belonging to the United States.”239 Jefferson, as the first
Secretary of State, declared: “What did I understand to be our right in
the Indian soil? 1. A right of preemption of their lands, that is to say, the
sole [and] exclusive right of purchasing from them whenever they should
be willing to sell. 2. A right of regulating the commerce between them
and the whites.”240 Here, Jefferson readily distinguishes the federal
interest in Indian land title from the authority to regulate commerce.
Second, New York, Virginia, Massachusetts, and Connecticut had
recently ceded their claims to 175 million acres of western Indian lands
after a great debate that turned the tide of the Revolutionary War and
consumed the deliberations of the Continental Congress.241 The state
235. See generally CHARLES H. AMBLER, GEORGE WASHINGTON AND THE WEST 147, 149–
50 (1936) (suggesting Washington’s expertise in surveying western lands and noting
his expansive land ownership).
236. See John C. Ranney, The Bases of American Federalism, 3 WM & MARY Q. 1, 28, 32
(Jan. 1946).
237. Id. at 17, 28 (describing Washington’s influence in the Constitution’s
acceptance and his importance to military veteran support).
238. See Treaty of Peace, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. II, Sept. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 80 (outlining the
geographical boundaries of the United States after the Revolutionary War).
239. In 1793, the Chief of Engineers of the War Department produced a map
showing the territories of the United States, Britain, and Spain on the North American
continent. This map demonstrates plainly that the United States asserted its territory
to include all lands west to the Mississippi, as described in the Treaty of Paris. The
region west of the Appalachians is described as the “Western Territory.” The lands of
various Tribal Nations are depicted on the map within that territory. See United States
of North America with the British Territories and Those of Spain According to the
Treaty of 1784, https://catalog.archives.gov/id/78116872 (last visited Oct. 17, 2018).
240. Notes of a Conversation with Mr. Hammond (June 3, 1792), in 1 THE WORKS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 219, 225 (Paul Leicester Ford, ed., 1904).
241. Acquisition of the Public Domain, 1781–1867, Bureau of Land Management,
Public Land Statistics, Table 1-1, Acquisition of the Public Domain BLM/OC/ST16/003+1165, P-108-5. May 2016. The western land cessions at this stage included all
of present-day Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, Illinois, Wisconsin, and half of Minnesota.
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cessions demonstrated the Framers’ understanding that the United
States held title to a vast territory of tribal lands. The state cessions all
used the term “territory,” to describe the claims to western Indian
lands transferred to the United States.242 The Northwest Ordinance
also uses the term “territory” repeatedly to describe the vast land area
northwest of the Ohio River.243 It is reasonable to assume that the
Framers used the term in the same sense as the contemporaneous
expressions of four state legislatures and Congress.
Third, the Northwest Ordinance specifically called for federal rules and
regulations on tribal lands.244 It provided that “laws founded in justice
and humanity, shall from time to time be made for preventing wrongs
being done to [Indian tribes], and for preserving peace and friendship
with them.”245 A fundamental purpose of the Territory Clause was to
address the problems of crime and violence on the tribal lands.
Finally, the Indian territory was the only federal territory in existence
at the time. In the current era, we think of the Territory Clause for the
management of National Forests or the territorial islands such as
Puerto Rico or Guam.246 However, none of these existed in 1787, and
the drafters of the Constitution could not have imagined they would.
The purpose of the Territory Clause for tribal lands is evident not
only in its structure and history, but also in the writing of the Framers.
In the Federalist Papers No. 7, Alexander Hamilton stated that the
purpose of the Territory Clause was to manage these recently ceded
western lands and avoid conflict between the states.247 Furthermore,
in the Federalist Papers No. 38, James Madison expressed a strong view

After the North Carolina and Georgia cessions, the total was 237 million acres ceded
to the federal government. Id.
242. See supra notes 161, 183–185 and accompanying text.
243. 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789 314–20 (1936).
244. Id. at 318.
245. Id.
246. See Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 536–37 (1911) (holding that Congress
has the authority to establish national forest reservations under the Territory Clause);
United States v. Rivera Torres, 826 F.2d 151, 154 (1st Cir. 1987) (“We begin with the
proposition that Congress can, pursuant to the plenary powers conferred by the
Territory Clause, legislate as to Puerto Rico in a manner different from the rest of the
United States” (citations omitted)).
247. Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist No. 7, [17 November 1787], FOUNDERS ONLINE,
http://Founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-04-02-0159 (last visited Oct. 17, 2018).
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that the Articles contained no authority to govern the ceded western
lands, and that the new constitution should contain such authority.248
This purpose of the Territory Clause was not the subject of
controversy during the Constitutional Convention because the need
for federal authority was apparent. In the Federalist Papers No. 43,
Madison wasted little ink: “This is a power of very great importance . . .
rendered absolutely necessary by jealousies and questions concerning
the Western territory sufficiently known to the public.”249
Just prior to the Constitutional Convention, Georgia and South
Carolina entered the Treaty of Beaufort to settle a border dispute.
This resolved South Carolina’s claim to a narrow strip of western land,
ceding to the United States all “right of preemption of the soil from
the native Indians.”250 Only the southern claims of North Carolina and
Madison’s Journal of the Constitutional
Georgia remained.251
Convention demonstrates how these were handled, and confirms the
purpose of the Territory Clause to provide federal control of the
Indian lands reserved by the Proclamation.252
E.

Journal of the Constitutional Convention Regarding the Territory Clause

On August 30, 1787, Daniel Carroll of Maryland, the last holdout to
sign the Articles of Confederation, began the discussion of the “crown
lands” that led to the text of the Territory Clause.253 Carroll suggested,
“that it might be proper to provide, that nothing in the Constitution
should affect the right of the United States to lands ceded by Great
Britain in the treaty of peace.”254
After some discussion of the process for new states, Carroll again
offered his proviso of federal jurisdiction for all lands “ceded to [the
United States] by the treaty of peace.”255 Madison suggested that the
248. James Madison, The Federalist No. 38, [12 January] 1788, FOUNDERS ONLINE,
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-10-02-0228 (last visited Oct. 17, 2018).
249. James Madison, The Federalist No. 43, [23 January] 1788, FOUNDERS ONLINE,
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-10-02-0248 (last visited Oct. 17, 2018).
250. LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, RESOLUTIONS OF CONGRESS UNDER THE CONFEDERATION,
TREATIES, PROCLAMATIONS, AND OTHER DOCUMENTS HAVING OPERATION AND RESPECT TO THE
PUBLIC LANDS 35 (1817).
251. Id.
252. James Madison, JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 654, 704 (E.H. Scott ed.,
1893) [hereinafter Madison, JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION] (suggesting the
United States has power to regulate commerce with Indian tribes).
253. Mary Virginia Geiger, DANIEL CARROLL, A FRAMER OF THE CONSTITUTION (1943).
254. Madison, JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 252, at 634.
255. See id. at 634–37.
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proviso should not affect the claims of particular States. Abraham
Baldwin from Georgia raised the doctrine of uti possidetis, a principle
of international law that newly formed states should have the same
territorial rights as before their independence.256 By this, Baldwin
intended to reserve Georgia’s claim to western lands.257
Madison suggested a savings clause to address Baldwin’s concern.258
There was a postponement on the issue, following which Gouverneur
Morris proposed the current text of the Territory Clause.259
Gouverneur Morris was a brilliant lawyer, leading drafter of the
Constitution, and one of Washington’s strongest congressional
supporters.260 He wrote, “The Legislature shall have power to dispose
of, and make all needful rules and regulations respecting, the territory
or other property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this
Constitution contained, shall be so construed as to prejudice any
claims, either of the United States or of any particular State.”261
Madison’s involvement is also noteworthy. He was a leading
advocate for addressing the perplexing problems of Indian Affairs
under the Articles of Confederation.262 The Articles had created
ambiguously shared power of “regulating the trade and managing all
affairs with the Indians, not members of any of the States, provided
that the legislative right of any State within its own limits be not
infringed or violated.”263 With the borders of seven states essentially
undefined, this provision was meaningless. In 1784, he wrote to James
Monroe, “If this proviso be taken in its full latitude, it must destroy the
authority of Congress altogether, since no act of Cong[ress] within the

256. See id. at 638; Uti Possidetis Juris, LEGAL INFORMATION INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/uti_possidetis_juris (last visited Oct. 17, 2018).
257. See Madison, JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 252, at 638.
258. Id. at 637–38.
259. See id. at 638.
260. See Delegates to the Constitutional Convention: Gouverneur Morris, TEACHING AM.
HIST., http://teachingamericanhistory.org/static/convention/delegates/morris_g.
html (last visited Oct. 17, 2018).
261. Madison, JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 252, at 638. The
proposed language was slightly amended and added to Article IV of the Constitution.
See id. at 760.
262. See Robert N. Clinton, The Dormant Indian Commerce Clause, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1055,
1152–53, 1155 (1995) (highlighting Madison’s role in ensuring that the federal
government, rather than state governments, retained authority to safeguard Indian affairs).
263. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1777, art. IX.
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limits of a State can be conceived which will not in some way or other
encroach upon the authority [of the] States.”264
At the beginning of the Constitutional Convention, Madison had
proposed a series of powers for Congress, the first three all related to issues
of western territory and Indian tribes: (1) disposing of unappropriated
lands of the United States; (2) instituting temporary governments for new
states formed in those lands; and (3) regulating affairs with the Indians,
both within and outside the limits of the United States.265 Madison’s
proposal for power to regulate all affairs with the Indians did not succeed
entirely and was limited to regulating commerce with the Indian tribes.266
However, he and the other federalists expanded the federal power “to
dispose of” unappropriated lands to include the power of “all needful
rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging
to the United States.”267 This provided the federal government with the
authority to regulate wherever it held territory, including Indian lands
where the federal government claimed the right of preemption.268 By
suggesting the savings clause for “any claims of the United States, or of
any particular state,” Madison quelled further debate and entrenched
federal authority over Indian territory in the text.269
All state claims to Indian lands were resolved through subsequent
land cessions. North Carolina ceded its lands at the time of
ratification.270 Georgia maintained a claim on lands until 1802 when
its cession required that “the United States shall, at their own expense,
extinguish . . . the Indian title to all the other lands within the State of
Georgia.”271 This last land cession from an original colony settled any
questions of claims for state authority on Indian lands.
264. Letter from James Madison to James Monroe, 27 November 1784, FOUNDERS
ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-08-02-0083 (last visited
Oct. 17, 2018).
265. NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 REPORTED BY JAMES
MADISON 477 (1987).
266. See Clinton, supra note 262, at 1153–55 (finding that, although Madison’s
proposal was not fully incorporated, Madison was the “primary proponent and
architect of the Indian Commerce Clause”).
267. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
268. Kyle S. Conway, Inherently or Exclusively Federal: Constitutional Preemption and the
Relationship Between Public Law 280 and Federalism, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1323, 1328–29
(2013) (listing several federal statutes that allow the government to regulate activities
on Indian lands).
269. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
270. An Act to Accept a Cession of the Claims of the State of North Carolina to a
Certain District of Western Territory, ch. 6, 1 Stat. 106 (1790).
271. See DONALDSON, supra note 74, at 81.
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Thus, the purpose of the Territory Clause, as drafted, was to grant
authority to the federal government to govern the huge expanse of
Indian territory that stretched both inside and outside the boundaries
of states.272 President Washington and the First Congress seized that
power immediately after ratification.
F.

The Indian Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790 and Washington’s
Promise to Indian Nations

Washington was sworn in as the first President of the United States
on April 30, 1789. He was anxious to come to peaceful terms with the
Indian tribes. While North Carolina continued to debate ratification
and its western land cession, Knox continued as Secretary of War.273 In
1789, Knox sent an extensive memorandum to Washington compiled
by a group of federal Indian commissioners who had traveled to meet
with the southern tribes.274 The memorandum reported discussions
with Piominko, who was the Principal War Chief of the Chickasaw

272. The relation of the Territory Clause to Indian lands was noted by early
American legal scholar James Kent, in his Commentaries on American Law:
The title is in the United States by the treaty of peace with Great Britain, and
by subsequent cessions from France and Spain . . . . The principle is, that the
Indians are . . . to be protected while in peace in the possession of their lands,
but to be deemed incapable of transferring the absolute title to any other than
the sovereign of the country. The constitution gave congress the power to
dispose of, and to make all needful rules and regulations respecting the
territory, or other property belonging to the United States, and to admit new
states into the union.
1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 258 (6th ed. 1848),
https://archive.org/details/commentariesonam01kent.
Kent also recognized the provisions of the Northwest Ordinance as principles of law
governing all tribal lands:
But while the ultimate right of our American governments to all the lands
within their jurisdictional limits, and the exclusive right of extinguishing the
Indian title by possession, is not to be shaken; it is equally true, that the Indian
possession is not to be taken from them, or disturbed, without their free
consent, by fair purchase, except it be by force of arms in the event of a just
and necessary war.
3 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 311–12 (1st ed. 1828).
273. MARK PULS, HENRY KNOX: VISIONARY GENERAL OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
200–01 (2008).
274. Washington’s Memoranda on Indian Affairs, 1789, FOUNDERS ONLINE,
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-04-02-0333 (last visited
Oct. 17, 2018).
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Nation, and highlighted the need for federal authority over Indian
land cessions from the states.275
Knox’s memorandum also includes a recommendation for licensing
Indian traders, to prevent fraudulent traders from creating strife with
the Indian tribes.276 Knox wrote to Washington again on July 7, 1789:
It would reflect honor on the new government and be attended with
happy effects were a declarative Law to be passed that the Indian
tribes possess the right of the soil of all lands within their limits
respectively and that they are not to be divested thereof but in
consequence of fair and bona fide purchases, made under the
authority, or with the express approbation of the United States.277

On January 4, 1790, in a comprehensive statement of Indian affairs
along the southern frontier, Knox estimated the cost of war and peace
with the Indian Nations along the southwestern frontier, and
concluded that peace and diplomacy were more honorable and more
cost-effective than war:
The various opinions which exist on the proper mode of treating the
Indians, require that some system should be established on the subject.
That the [I]ndians possess the natural rights of man, and that they
ought not wantonly to be divested thereof cannot be well denied.
Were these rights ascertained, and declared by law—were it enacted
that the [I]ndians possess the right to all their territory which they
have not fairly conveyed, and that they should not be divested
thereof, but in consequence of open treaties, made under the
authority of the United States, the foundation of peace and justice
would be laid.278

As a result, Congress enacted the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act
on July 22, 1790.279 It contains virtually identical legal principles to
those incorporated into the Proclamation of 1763 and repeated in the
275. Piominko believed North Carolina would probably adopt the Constitution and
cede its western lands to the United States, and he expected better protection from
the federal government than North Carolina had provided, citing 25 killed, 8
wounded, and a considerable number of horses taken in one summer. Washington’s
Memoranda on Indian Affairs, 1789, FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://founders.archives.
gov/documents/Washington/05-04-02-0333 (last visited Oct. 17, 2018).
276. Id.
277. Letter to George Washington from Henry Knox, 7 July 1789, FOUNDERS
ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-03-02-0067 (last
visited Oct. 17, 2018).
278. Letter to George Washington from Henry Knox, 4 January 1790, FOUNDERS
ONLINE, http://Founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-04-02-0353 (last
visited Oct. 17, 2018).
279. Indian Trade and Intercourse Act, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137 (1790).
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Northwest Ordinance: (1) regulation of trade in Section 3; (2) a
federal right of preemption to tribal lands in Section 4; and (3)
criminal laws to prevent violence between Indians and non-Indians in
Section 5.280
Two things are noteworthy in the statutory language. First, it affirms
a federal right of preemption in tribal lands, a property or territorial
interest tied to the Framers’ understanding that the federal
government is trustee and tribal lands cannot be sold without tribal
consent.281 Second, the criminal provisions demonstrate that Congress
did not limit its authority to only Indian commerce or treaties. The
First Congress asserted criminal jurisdiction in Indian territory.282
Soon after enactment of the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act,
President Washington wrote to the Seneca Nation of New York in 1790:
I am not uninformed that the six nations have been led into some
difficulties with respect to the sale of their lands since the peace. But
280. Id. at 137–38. The three sections of the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act
asserting these rights are:
SEC. 3. And be it further enacted, That every person who shall attempt to trade
with the Indian tribes, or be found in the Indian country with such
merchandise in his possession as are usually vended to the Indians, without a
license first had and obtained, as in this act prescribed, and being thereof
convicted in any court proper to try the same, shall forfeit all the merchandise
so offered for sale to the Indian tribes, or so found in the Indian country,
which forfeiture shall be one half to the benefit of the person prosecuting,
and the other half to the benefit of the United States.
SEC. 4. And be it enacted and declared, That no sale of lands made by any Indians,
or any nation or tribe of Indians within the United States, shall be valid to any
person or persons, or to any state, whether having the right of pre-emption to
such lands or not, unless the same shall be made and duly executed at some
public treaty, held under the authority of the United States.
SEC. 5. And be it further enacted, That if any citizen or inhabitant of the United
States, or of either of the territorial districts of the United States, shall go into
any town, settlement or territory belonging to any nation or tribe of Indians,
and shall there commit any crime upon, or trespass against, the person or
property of any peaceable and friendly Indian or Indians, which, if committed
within the jurisdiction of any state, or within the jurisdiction of either of the
said districts, against a citizen or white inhabitant thereof, would be
punishable by the laws of such state or district, such offender or offenders shall
be subject to the same punishment, and shall be proceeded against in the same
manner as if the offence had been committed within the jurisdiction of the
state or district to which he or they may belong, against a citizen or white in
habitant thereof.
Id.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 137.
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I must inform you that these arose before the present government
of the United States was established, when the separate States, and
individuals under their authority, undertook to treat with the Indian
tribes respecting the sale of their lands.
But the case is now entirely altered—the general government only
has the power to treat with the Indian nations, and any treaty formed
and held without its authority will not be binding.
Here then is the security for the remainder of your lands—No state
nor person can purchase your lands, unless at some public treaty
held under the Authority of the United States. The general
Government will never consent to your being defrauded—But it will
protect you in all your just rights . . . .
But your great object seems to be the security of your remaining
lands, and I have therefore upon this point, me[a]nt to be
sufficiently strong and clear.
That in future you cannot be defrauded of your lands—That you
possess the right to sell, and the right of refusing to sell your lands.283

Washington’s covenant with the Indian Nations to protect Indian lands
and hold them in trust is woven into the fiber of the Territory Clause,
the Northwest Ordinance, and is in effect today.284 Washington’s
commitment will remain in effect so long as the United States remembers
the promises made to Indian Nations during the framing of the Constitution.
II. THE ORIGIN OF THE DEFINITION OF INDIAN COUNTRY
Washington and his military commanders used the term “Indian
country” during the Revolutionary War, referring to land that was
occupied and held by Indian tribes.285 This term entered federal law

283. Letter from George Washington to the Seneca Chiefs, 29 December 1790,
FOUNDERS
ONLINE,
(alterations
in
original),
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-07-02-0080 (last visited
Oct. 17, 2018).
284. See 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2012) (“No purchase, grant, lease, or other conveyance of
lands, or of any title or claim thereto, from any Indian nation or tribe of Indians, shall
be of any validity in law or equity, unless the same be made by treaty or convention
entered into pursuant to the Constitution.”); see also supra notes 52–64, 81–83.
285. See, e.g., Letter from George Washington to Major General Philip Schuyler, 11
February 1779, FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/
Washington/03-19-02-0178 (last visited Oct. 17, 2018) (“The route being fixed on,
what time . . . will it require to penetrate to the heart of the Indian country or to the
principal object or point of the expedition?”); Letter to George Washington from
Timothy Pickering, 19 May 1778, FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/
documents/Washington/03-15-02-0162 (last visited Oct. 17, 2018) (“Congress have in
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early on, and is still in use today. Indian country is defined at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1151 (2012), and determines the geographic scope of federal, tribal,
and state government jurisdiction for many purposes:
Except as otherwise provided in sections 1154 and 1156 of this title,
the term “Indian country,” as used in this chapter, means (a) all land
within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of
the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any
patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the
reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities within the
borders of the United States whether within the original or
subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or
without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian
titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way
running through the same.286

This Part provides a detailed legislative history of the definition of
“Indian country,” demonstrating its roots in the Territory Clause. The
definition was created during codification of Title 18 of the United
States Code in 1948.287 Because of this, its legislative history is very
limited. The short note from the House Committee on the Revision
of the Laws cites a few cases and provides that: “This section
consolidates numerous conflicting and inconsistent provisions of law
into a concise statement of the applicable law.”288 In light of this scarce
record, this Part traces the history of the definition of Indian country
at 18 U.S.C. § 1151.
A.

Indian Country in the Early Federal Laws

Knox developed the first Indian Trade and Intercourse Act in 1790
and included the undefined term “Indian country,” using it
interchangeably with “any town, settlement or territory belonging to
any nation or tribe of Indians.”289
The first Indian Trade and Intercourse Act included provisions
punishing crimes committed within the Indian territory.290 The House
of Representatives debated the criminal provisions during

contemplation an expedition against Detroit, or at least into the Indian country, that
they may strike at the root of the mischief.”).
286. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012).
287. Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 25, 63 Stat. 89, 94 (1949); Act of June 25, 1948,
ch. 645, 62 Stat. 683, 757 (1948).
288. H.R. Rep. No. 80-304, at A91 (1947).
289. Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, § 5, 1 Stat. 137, 138 (1790).
290. Id.
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reauthorization in December of 1792. Some urged removal of the
criminal provisions because they were fully provided for by treaties or
by the laws of the States.291 The motion was defeated with an argument
based in the Territory Clause. Specifically, the government has the
power to legislate in the territories because without this power there
cannot be peace with the Indian tribes, and it was impossible for every
case to be addressed by the terms of treaties.292
Congress reauthorized the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act
successively every three years until 1802 when Congress made the Act
permanent.293 The amendments grew more specific to address
problems on the frontier, and succeeding versions described “Indian
country” by the boundaries established in treaties. For example, the
1796 Act fixed a western boundary and required passports for nonIndians to travel across the border, providing that the line could be adjusted
for ongoing treaty cessions.294 In 1799 and 1802, the boundary was
conformed to new treaties.295 In both of these new laws, the terms “Indian
country” and “Indian territory” are undefined and used synonymously.296
In 1817, Congress enacted the first version of the Indian Country
Crimes Act.297 It provided for federal punishment of crimes whether
committed by an Indian or non-Indian. However, it provided an
exception for “any offence committed by one Indian against another.”
This exception is still found in current law.298 While the 1817 Act did not
use the term “Indian country,” it applied to “any town, district, or territory,
belonging to any nation or nations, tribe or tribes, of Indians.”299
The Indian Trade and Intercourse Act of 1834300 was a significant
adjustment of federal Indian policy in the wake of the Indian Removal
Act301 and President Jackson’s policy of dispossessing the southeastern

291. 2 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 750–51 (Gales & Seaton eds., 1792).
292. Id. at 751.
293. Act of Mar. 30, 1802, ch. 13, 2 Stat. 139 (1802); Act of Mar. 3, 1799, ch. 46, 1
Stat. 743 (1799); Act of May 19, 1976, ch. 30, 1 Stat. 469 (1796); Act of Mar. 1, 1793,
ch. 19, 1 Stat. 329 (1793).
294. See § 3, 1 Stat. at 470.
295. See § 1, 2 Stat. at 139–41; § 1, 1 Stat. at 743–44.
296. See 2 Stat. 139; 1 Stat. 743.
297. Act of Mar. 3, 1817, ch. 92, 3 Stat. 383 (1817) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1152 (2012)).
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729 (1834).
301. Act of May 28, 1830, ch. 148, § 5, 4 Stat. 411, 412 (1830).
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tribes of their lands and relocating them to Oklahoma.302 The 1834
Act’s updated definition of “Indian country” was intended to hasten
the removal of the southeastern tribes to the West:
That all that part of the United States west of the Mississippi, and not
within the states of Missouri and Louisiana, or the territory of
Arkansas, and, also, that part of the United States east of the
Mississippi River, and not within any state to which the Indian title
has not been extinguished, for the purposes of this act, be taken and
deemed to be the Indian country.303

This new definition caused significant confusion, particularly over
tribal lands located within the boundary of a state but expressly
exempted from the state’s jurisdiction by treaty or statute.304 The term
“Indian country” became even more perplexing after 1874 when
Congress omitted the definition. The Revised Statutes of 1874 was the
first codification of federal laws and repealed all prior federal statutes
passed.305 The Indian Trade and Intercourse Act of 1834 was codified
in its entirety, omitting only the definition of “Indian country.”306 The
omission was likely intentional, as treaty boundaries had shifted
significantly westward.

302. Jackson passed the Indian Removal Act in violation of Supreme Court rulings
that American Indian lands were protected by treaties. Jackson’s aggressive relocation
policies resulted in the mass displacement and forced resettlement of more than
100,000 Indians. For a discussion of the consequences of Indian removal policies in
the United States, see T.S. Twibell, Rethinking Johnson v. M’intosh (1823): The Root of
the Continued Forced Displacement of American Indians Despite Cobell v. Norton (2001), 23
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J., 129, 153–54 (2008).
303. See § 1, § 4 Stat. at 729 (“That all that part of the United States west of the
Mississippi, and not within the states of Missouri and Louisiana, or the territory of
Arkansas, and, also, that part of the United States east of the Mississippi River, and not
within any state to which the Indian title has not been extinguished, for the purposes
of this act, be taken and deemed to be the Indian country.”).
304. See, e.g., United States v. Seveloff, 27 F. Cas. 1021, 1024 (D.C.D. Or. 1872) (No.
16,525) (holding that the 1834 definition of Indian country did not extend to Alaska
because Alaska was not United States territory until 1868, but cautioning that the
conclusion was made “with hesitation,” and “subject to correction” until Congress
clarified the definition of Indian country); United States v. Ward, 28 F. Cas. 397, 398–
99 (C.C.D. Kans. 1863) (No. 16,639) (struggling to determine whether the 1834 Act
applied to Indians residing in Kansas, which became a state after the passage of the
Act); see also H.R. Rep. No. 23-474, at 4 (1834) (noting that the limits and extent of
Indian country is difficult to determine with accuracy because of the various treaties
since 1802 that adjusted its boundaries).
305. See generally 1 REVISED STATUTES OF THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1878).
306. Id. at 369–70.
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In Bates v. Clark,307 the Supreme Court grappled with this statutorily
undefined “Indian country.”308 An Army officer had seized a shipment
of alcohol, and the question presented was whether this occurred
within the federal jurisdiction of “Indian country.”309 Justice Miller was
undeterred by the lack of a specific definition and observed that
“[n]otwithstanding the immense changes which [had] since taken
place in the vast region covered by the act of 1834,” Congress had not
changed the definition of Indian country nor changed the large body
of laws governing the territory.310 From this, he reasoned that Congress
intended for the definition of Indian Country to be adaptable to “the
altered circumstances of what was then Indian country as to enable
[Congress and the courts] to ascertain what it was at any time since then.”311
The Court then adopted the territorial concept of Indian lands that
was the constant in the Indian Trade and Intercourse Acts from 1790
to 1834: “The simple criterion is that as to all the lands thus described
it was Indian country whenever the Indian title had not been
extinguished, and it continued to be Indian country so long as
the Indians had title to it, and no longer.”312
Congress soon created a different rule in the Major Crimes Act of
1885.313 In a departure from previous Indian legislation, Congress did
not define federal jurisdiction in terms of “Indian country.” Instead,
the Major Crimes Act was written to apply “within the limits of any
Indian reservation,” including those “within the boundaries of any
state.”314 With its zeal to punish Indian crime, Congress appears to
have deliberately expanded the scope of federal criminal jurisdiction
to include fee lands on Indian reservations. By 1885, lands within many
reservations were allotted to individual Indians in fee under the terms of
treaties.315 Additionally, some reservation lands were granted to states

307. 95 U.S. 204 (1877).
308. See id. at 206–07 (explaining that, despite the addition of new states and territories,
“Congress has not thought it necessary to make any new definition of Indian country” since
the 1834 Indian Trade and Intercourse Act, over forty years earlier).
309. Id. at 204–06.
310. Id. at 207.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 208.
313. Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, 23 Stat. 362 (1885) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 1153 (2012)).
314. Id. § 9, 23 Stat. at 385.
315. See Marc Slonim, Speech at Gonzaga University Law School Indian Law Lecture
Series: Indian Country, Indian Reservations, and the Importance of History in Indian Law
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under federal land grants and for rights-of-way.316 Congress later
incorporated this expanded boundary into the definition of “Indian
country.”
The General Allotment Act of 1887317 accelerated the process of
transferring trust lands to fee status, cutting up reservations into
individual allotments, opening the remainder to settlement, and
granting citizenship to Indian people who received lands in fee.318
Indian tribes lost more than ninety million acres, or two-thirds of tribal
land base.319 In his 1901 inauguration address, President Roosevelt
restated the vision for Indian allotment: “The General Allotment Act
is a mighty pulverizing engine to break up the tribal mass . . . Under its
provisions some sixty thousand Indians have already become citizens
of the United States.”320 As the General Allotment Act began to run its
course, legal questions began to arise about federal jurisdiction with
the changing circumstances.
These questions culminated in the controversial Supreme Court
decision in In re Heff321 in 1905, which declared that Indians who were
granted citizenship by the General Allotment Act were subject to state
jurisdiction, and were not to receive the protections of federal criminal
laws within Indian reservations.322 This was perhaps the nadir for the
United States regarding the commitments made by the constitutional
founders to the Indian tribes. The decision caused significant controversy
because Indian people were no longer protected by federal laws. The
Supreme Court soon cut back on Heff, reconsidering the text of the Major
Crimes Act and Congress’s power under the Territory Clause.

(Oct. 27, 2009), in 45 GONZ. L. REV. 517, 521–22, 524, 527 (2009–2010) (describing
the progression of Indian land ownership from 1802–1903).
316. Id. at 524.
317. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887).
318. See Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 8–10 (1995)
(“Under the [General Allotment] Act, individual Indians received a certain number
of acres in reservation land. . . . [T]he allottee was expected to assimilate to
agriculture, to Christianity, and to citizenship.”).
319. Slonim, supra note 315, at 522.
320. See Theodore Roosevelt’s First Annual Message, December 3, 1901, 35 Cong.
Rec. 81, at 90 (1902).
321. 197 U.S. 488 (1905), overruled in part by United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591 (1916).
322. See id. at 50 (declaring that “when the United States grants the privileges of
citizenship to an Indian, gives to him the benefit of and requires him to be subject to
the laws, both civil and criminal, of the State, it places him outside the reach of police
regulations on the part of Congress”).

2018]
B.

INDIAN COUNTRY AND THE TERRITORY CLAUSE

251

Celestine + Sandoval + Pelican = 18 USC § 1151(a)(b) and (c)

In three cases, the Supreme Court settled the question of the scope
of federal jurisdiction in Indian Country, and Congress codified their
rulings into the current statutory definition of Indian Country. The
most important is United States v. Celestine.323
Celestine is a lynchpin of contemporary federal Indian law. Often
cited in cases involving reservation diminishment,324 or the Indian
canon of construction,325 its broader significance is generally
unrecognized. The impact of Celestine on federal Indian law is seen in
a 1911 report to Congress from the Secretary of Interior.326 The report
explained that after the decision in Heff, the “question of federal police
jurisdiction over allotted Indian territories was up in the air.” As an
answer to that question, the report cited the Court’s holding in Celestine
that “upheld the jurisdiction of the Federal Courts upon Indian
allotments within an Indian reservation even though the allotment had
been patented” as the answer to that question.327
Consider if the Celestine Court had ruled the other way and
continued to follow Heff.328 Kagama and its progeny had shifted the
legal analysis away from federal territorial jurisdiction, and towards a
notion of Indians as trust wards.329 As Indians became citizens under the
allotment laws, the notion of Indian incompetency was not sustainable.330
Under Heff, Indians who received allotments would be outside federal
jurisdiction.331 State jurisdiction would have entered all allotted
reservations, and reservation borders would have in effect vanished.
Roosevelt’s vision of a “pulverizing engine” would have become reality.332

323. 215 U.S. 278 (1909).
324. See, e.g., Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 470 (1984).
325. See Richard B. Collins, Never Construed to Their Prejudice: In Honor of David
Getches, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 2–3, 6, 8, 9, 21–22 (2013) (explaining the cannons, or
different methods of judicial interpretation, in approaching ambiguities in federal
statutes and treaties relating to the Indian nations).
326. See R.A. BALLINGER, LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY OF INTERIOR IN RESPONSE TO
SENATE RESOLUTION OF JANUARY 13, 1911, S. DOC. NO. 61-707 (1911).
327. Id. at 13.
328. 197 U.S. 488 (1905). Heff was later overturned in United States v. Nice, which
relied on the principle from Celestine that federal jurisdiction was based on tribal land
status. See 241 U.S. 591, 601 (1916).
329. See, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383–84 (1885).
330. See Royster, supra note 318, at 9–10.
331. See In re Heff, 197 U.S. at 509.
332. See Theodore Roosevelt’s First Annual Message, December 3, 1901, 35 Cong.
Rec. 81, at 90 (1902).
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In direct reliance on the Territory Clause, Celestine restored federal
criminal authority in Indian country. Justice Brewer wrote for a
unanimous Court and began his analysis with the Territory Clause:
By the second clause of [Section] 3, Art. IV, of the Constitution, to
Congress, and to it alone, is given “power to dispose of and make all
needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other
property belonging to the United States.” From an early time in the
history of the government, it has exercised this power, and has also
been legislating concerning Indians occupying such territory.333

Justice Brewer then explained the scope of federal jurisdiction
under the Major Crimes Act as including “all land within the limits of
any reservation”:
[It] was decided, in Bates v. Clark . . . , that all the country described
in the act as “Indian country” remains such “so long as the Indians
retain their original title to the soil, and ceases to be Indian country
whenever they lose that title, in the absence of any different
provision by treaty or by act of Congress.”
But the word “reservation” has a different meaning . . . . The word is
used in the land law to describe any body of land, large or small, which
Congress has reserved from sale for any purpose. It may be a military
reservation, or an Indian reservation, or, indeed, one for any purpose
for which Congress has authority to provide, and, when Congress has
once established a reservation, all tracts included within it remain a part
of the reservation until separated therefrom by Congress.334

From Celestine, we can see how § 1151(a) of the Indian country
definition was constructed: all land “within the limits of any Indian
reservation” is lifted directly from the text of what was then the Major
Crimes Act.335 “Notwithstanding the issuance of any patent” is the
holding in Celestine that Indian allotments are not excepted from the
reservation.336 As stated by the Court: “Although the defendant had
received a patent for the land within that reservation, and although the
murdered woman was the owner of another tract within such limits,

333. United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278, 284 (1909).
334. Id. at 285 (citations omitted).
335. Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (1885) (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2012)).
336. Celestine, 215 U.S. at 278, 289–91. At least one court has noted this derivation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a) from Celestine. See Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 521 F. Supp. 1072,
1084 (D. Utah 1981) (noting that after Celestine, “[t]he courts continued to expand the
definition of Indian country until 1948, when Congress codified these judicial
expressions into statutory law as 18 U.S.C. § 1151”).
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also patented, both tracts remained within the reservation until
Congress excluded them therefrom.”337
The Celestine Court relied on an important tax decision six years
earlier, United States v. Rickert,338 which preempted state taxes within
Indian country in direct reliance on the Territory Clause.339 A young
Willis Van Devanter, who served as Assistant Attorney General for the
Department of the Interior from 1897 to 1903, instituted the lawsuit
and argued for the government.340 In 1903, President Roosevelt
appointed Justice Van Devanter an appellate judge on the Eighth
Circuit.341 President Taft nominated him for the Supreme Court,
where he served from 1910 to 1937 and wrote many opinions
addressing federal Indian law.342 Justice Van Devanter gained a deep
understanding of both federal land law and Indian law long before he
became a Justice. Beginning with Rickert, Justice Van Devanter’s
reasoning from the Territory Clause pervades the cases codified into
the statutory definition of “Indian country.”
Justice Van Devanter authored United States v. Sandoval,343 widely
recognized as a landmark decision affirming the federally-protected
status of tribal lands. Here again, the citizenship of Indians did not
prevent Congress from enacting laws to protect and benefit tribes.344
Subsection (b) of the Indian country definition is a verbatim excerpt
from Justice Van Devanter’s opinion:
Not only does the Constitution expressly authorize Congress to
regulate commerce with the Indian tribes, but long continued
legislative and executive usage and an unbroken current of judicial
decisions have attributed to the United States . . . the power and the
duty of exercising a fostering care and protection over all dependent
Indian communities within its borders, whether within its original territory
or territory subsequently acquired, and whether within or without the limits
of a State.345

337. Celestine, 215 U.S. at 284.
338. 188 U.S. 432 (1903).
339. Id. at 439.
340. See Collins, supra note 325, at 29.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 30.
343. 231 U.S. 28 (1913).
344. See id. at 45–46.
345. Compare id. (emphasis added), with 18 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (2012) (incorporating
the emphasized language).
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The Sandoval decision relied on the terms of the New Mexico
Enabling Act346 which reserved Indian lands to federal jurisdiction.347
The Enabling Act demonstrates the close relationship between
creation of new states and reservation of federal lands contemplated
in Article IV, Section 3. Its language echoes the Territory Clause:
That the people inhabiting said proposed State do agree and declare
that they forever disclaim all right and title . . . to all lands lying
within said boundaries owned or held by any Indian or Indian tribes
the right or title to which shall have been acquired through or from
the United States or any prior sovereignty, and that until the title of
such Indian or Indian tribes shall have been extinguished the same
shall be and remain subject to the disposition and under the
absolute jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United
States.348

The Court in Sandoval cites Celestine and Rickert for the principle that
federal jurisdiction is not based on citizenship, but on the federal
status of Indian lands.349 The Sandoval Court also found that fee simple
lands held communally by an Indian tribe are federal territory.350

346. Act of June 20, 1910, ch. 310, 36 Stat. 557 (1910).
347. See Sandoval, 231 U.S. at 36–37 (articulating the purposes of the Enabling Act,
which included treating the lands of the Pueblo Indians as Indian country).
348. 36 Stat. at 569. “Any prior sovereignty” is a reference to the 1848 transfer of
lands from Mexico to the United States through the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.
Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits and Settlement with the Republic of Mexico, Mex.U.S., art. V, VII, IX, XI, May 30, 1848, 9 Stat. 922. Under the laws of Spain and Mexico,
Indian lands were similarly subject to a right of preemption. See United States v.
Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432, 442 (1926). Just as with the Treaty of Paris in 1783, this right
of preemption transferred to the United States under the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalago, while Indian tribes retained title. See 9 Stat. at 930.
349. Sandoval, 231 U.S. at 48.
350. The Court explained:
[i]n other words, the lands are public lands of the pueblo, and so the situation
is essentially the same as it was with the Five Civilized Tribes, whose lands,
although owned in fee under patents from the United States, were adjudged
subject to the legislation of Congress enacted in the exercise of the
Government’s guardianship over those tribes and their affairs.
See id. (citing United States v. Wright, 229 U.S. 226 (1913); Gritts v. Fisher, 224 U.S.
640 (1912); Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413 (1912); Cherokee Nation v.
Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294, 308 (1902); Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445, 488
(1899)). In United States v. Chavez, the Court again found that the Pueblo of Isleta’s
“communal ownership of the full title in fee simple” is not an obstacle to federal
protection of Indian lands. See 290 U.S. 357, 363 (1933). Patented fee title likewise
does not undermine Indian country status of Creek Nation lands. See United States v.
Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103, 109–11 (1935).
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Sandoval is particularly significant because the lower court had relied
on Heff to find that Pueblo lands were subject to state police jurisdiction
and state taxation and land seizure along with “emancipation from
federal control.”351 Celestine and Sandoval together marked a significant
retreat from the assimilationist policies of the nineteenth century, and
both were based on federal territorial authority in Indian country.
The other source of § 1151(b) is United States v. McGowan.352 In 1917,
the federal government purchased twenty acres near Reno, Nevada for
three traditionally nomadic Indian tribes displaced by settlement.353
The question was whether lands purchased for Indian tribes also fell
within the scope of “Indian country.”354 After considering elements
similar to those in Sandoval, the Court concluded: “The Government
retains title to the lands, which it permits the Indians to occupy. The
Government has authority to enact regulations and protective laws
respecting this territory.”355
Subsection 1151(c) of the Indian country definition includes “all
Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been
extinguished.”356 This subsection derived from United States v.
Pelican,357 where the Court upheld a federal indictment for a murder
on an Indian allotment outside the boundaries of a reservation.358 The
northern half of the Colville Indian Reservation had been “vacated and
restored to the public domain.”359 However, tribal citizens residing on
that portion of the reservation were entitled to trust allotments.360 The
Court again relied on Celestine, finding that “the lands, being so held,
continued to be under the jurisdiction and control of Congress.”361
Both § 1151(a) and § 1151(c) include rights-of-way within a
reservation or allotment.362 These are included on the basis of United
States v. Soldana363 stating “it is clear that it was not the purpose of
351. United States v. Sandoval, 198 F. 539, 552–53 (D.N.M. 1912) (quoting In re
Heff, 197 U.S. 488, 509 (1905)).
352. 302 U.S. 535 (1938).
353. Id. at 537.
354. Id. at 536.
355. Id. at 539.
356. 18 U.S.C. § 1151(c) (2012).
357. 232 U.S. 442 (1914).
358. Id. at 451–52.
359. Id. at 445 (citing Act of July 1, 1892, chap. 140, 27 Stat. 62, 63 (1893)).
360. Id. at 449.
361. Id. at 447.
362. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1151(a), (c) (2012).
363. 246 U.S. 530 (1918).
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Congress to extinguish the title of the Indians in the land comprised
within the right of way.”364 In Minnesota v. United States,365 another case
addressing rights of way, the Court explained, “the United States owns
the fee of these parcels, the right of way cannot be condemned without
making it a party.”366
Each of the Supreme Court decisions used to construct the statutory
definition of Indian country relies on authority from the Territory
Clause. A significant number of cases from this era built on the
Territory Clause principles in Celestine and Rickert.367
Justice Van Devanter retired in 1937, and the fertile period of
Supreme Court decisions reasoning from the Territory Clause came to
a close. However, Congress picked up the torch. During the
codification of Title 18 in 1948, the House Committee on the Revision
of the Laws constructed the definition of Indian country from these
territorial decisions, at 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1946). Although legislative
history from this enormous codification project is limited, the
provisions in the statute trace directly to quotations from both Celestine
and Sandoval. Legal digests from the era support the relationship
between these decisions and the definition. For example, the 1916
edition of Ruling Case Law (the predecessor to American Jurisprudence)
includes a section on “What is Indian country” citing prominently to
Celestine, Sandoval, and Pelican.368
In 1962, the Supreme Court interpreted § 1151 in Seymour v.
Superintendent of Washington State Penitentiary369 and, relying heavily on
Celestine, confirmed federal jurisdiction over fee lands within
reservation boundaries.370 Although the State argued that the words

364. Id. at 532–33.
365. 305 U.S. 382 (1939).
366. Id. at 386.
367. See, e.g., United States v. Ramsey, 271 U.S. 467, 469–71 (1926); United States v.
Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432, 440 (1926); Alaska Pac. Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S.
78, 88–90 (1918); United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591, 600–01 (1916); United States v.
Noble, 237 U.S. 74, 80–81 (1915); Perrin v. United States, 232 U.S. 478, 486 (1914);
United States v. Mille Lac Band of Chippewa Indians, 229 U.S. 498, 509–10 (1913);
United States v. Wright, 229 U.S. 226, 234 (1913); Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 673
(1912); Clairmont v. United States, 225 U.S. 551, 557–58 (1912); Heckman v. United
States, 224 U.S. 413, 436 (1912); Hallowell v. United States, 221 U.S. 317, 324 (1911);
Tiger v. Western Inv. Co., 221 U.S. 286, 309 (1911); United States v. Sutton, 215 U.S.
291, 294–96 (1909).
368. 14 RULING CASE LAW § 33 (William M. McKinney & Burdett A. Rich eds., 1916).
369. 368 U.S. 351 (1962).
370. Id. at 359.
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“notwithstanding the issuance of any patent” in § 1151(a) should be
interpreted as “notwithstanding the issuance of any patent to an
Indian,” which would terminate federal jurisdiction on patents issued to
non-Indians, the Court found that such an interpret would create “an
impractical pattern of checkerboard jurisdiction” that § 1151 sought to
avoid.371 Instead, the Court reemphasized that all parts of a reservation
remained under federal jurisdiction until removed by Congress.372
Later cases interpreting the scope of federal criminal jurisdiction in
Indian country frequently described the principle of federal authority
in the language of territorial authority. In United States v. Antelope,373
the Indian defendants asserted a violation of equal protection where
the federal murder statute did not require the same proof of
premeditation as state law.374 Justice Brennan discounted the equal
protection claims because defendants were “subjected to the same
body of law as any other individual, Indian or non-Indian, charged with
first-degree murder committed in a federal enclave.”375
The status of the Mississippi Choctaw lands became the subject of
United States v. John,376 where the Supreme Court made it clear that any
lands placed into trust for an Indian tribe are Indian country.377
Furthermore in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,378 the Court found
that “Indian reservations are ‘a part of the territory of the United
States,’” but held that Congress had not provided for Indian tribes to
exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.379 However, the Court
anticipated Congress’s authority to do so: “Finally, we are not unaware
of the prevalence of non-Indian crime on today’s reservations which
the tribes forcefully argue requires the ability to try non-Indians. But

371. Id. at 358.
372. Id.
373. 430 U.S. 641 (1977).
374. Id. at 643–44.
375. Id. at 648.
376. 437 U.S. 634 (1978).
377. Id. at 649. (“The Mississippi lands in question here were declared by Congress
to be held in trust by the Federal Government for the benefit of the Mississippi
Choctaw Indians who were at that time under federal supervision. There is no
apparent reason why these lands, which had been purchased in previous years for the
aid of those Indians, did not become a ‘reservation,’ at least for the purposes of federal
criminal jurisdiction at that particular time.”).
378. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
379. Id. at 208–09, 211.
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these are considerations for Congress to weigh in deciding whether
Indian tribes should finally be authorized to try non-Indians.”380
The most recent case was Lara, discussed above,381 where the
Supreme Court rejected a challenge to tribal criminal authority over
non-member Indians.382 Justice Breyer, writing for a seven justice
majority, reaffirmed the role of the Territory Clause as one of the
sources of Congress’s “broad” and “exclusive” powers “to legislate in
respect to Indian tribes.”383 Thus, the principles of the Territory Clause
are embedded in contemporary Supreme Court decisions affecting
federal and tribal criminal jurisdiction in Indian country.
III. INDIAN COUNTRY IS FEDERALLY PROTECTED TRIBAL TERRITORY
This Part returns to the primary basis for contending that the
Territory Clause is authority for federal laws in Indian country—
structure. It briefly examines the federal title interest in Indian lands
as well as common legal principles shared with other federal lands
regarding land transactions, water rights, criminal law, as well as
federal jurisdiction over matters on fee inholdings and adjacent lands.
A.

Federal Title Interest in Indian Lands

The status of Indian lands as federal territory is self-evident. The
federal government in fact holds a title interest in Indian lands.384 The
first principle of property law is that property is a bundle of rights,
frequently divided among different parties.385 This is the case with
Indian lands. The Indian tribe holds the original Indian title,
sometimes known as aboriginal title, or right of occupancy.386 The
380. Id. at 212.
381. See supra notes 29–33, 45–46 and accompanying text.
382. 541 U.S. 193, 210 (2004).
383. Id. at 200 (quotation marks omitted). Lara thus resolved an issue, debated in
academic circles, about whether Indian trust lands “belong[] to the United States,”
within the meaning of the Territory Clause. See infra Section IV (discussing the
evolution of FELIX S. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW in its treatment of the
Territory Clause).
384. See supra note 74 and accompanying discussion.
385. See J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711,
712–14 (1996).
386. The Supreme Court found “their right of occupancy is considered as sacred as
the fee simple of whites.” Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. 711, 746 (1835). “Trust”
and “restricted fee” are often used interchangeably and are essentially synonyms, as a
“restraint on alienation” is a trust provision that prohibits or penalizes alienation of
the trust corpus. See Restraint on Alienation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).

2018]

INDIAN COUNTRY AND THE TERRITORY CLAUSE

259

United States holds an interest in Indian land title known as the right
of preemption or alienation.387 This is the origin of the land title
system in the United States and the reason that property law textbooks
have included Johnson v. M’Intosh388 for generations. “The ceded
territory was occupied by numerous and warlike tribes of Indians; but
the exclusive right of the United States to extinguish their title, and to
grant the soil, has never, we believe, been doubted.”389
The Supreme Court has consistently acknowledged the federal title
interest in Indian land. In The New York Indians,390 the Court voided a
state tax on reservation lands of the Seneca Nation.391 The Court
explained that “the Indian right of occupancy creates an indefeasible
title to the reservations that may extend from generation to
generation, and will cease only by the dissolution of the tribe, or their
consent to sell to the party possessed of the right of pre-emption.”392
More than a century later, in Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida,393
the Court unanimously restated this principle.394
The bedrock source of the federal interest in Indian land is the
restriction on alienation found in the Indian Trade and Intercourse
Act—also known as the Nonintercourse Act.395 This was one of the first
laws passed in 1790 at the insistence of President Washington, and it
remains federal law.396 The text of the statute prohibits any taking of
title to Indian land that is not made pursuant to the Constitution

Tribal lands are better termed as federal territory rather than property of the United
States. The tribes hold full possession and occupancy, while the United States asserts
a right of preemption combined with a right to govern. See Michael C. Blumm, Why
Aboriginal Title is a Fee Simple Absolute, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV., 975, 983–85 (2011).
387. Blumm, supra note 386, at 983–85.
388. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
389. Id. at 586.
390. 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 761 (1866).
391. Id. at 771.
392. Id. at 771.
393. 414 U.S. 661 (1974).
394. Id. at 667 (“It very early became accepted doctrine in this Court that although fee
title to the lands occupied by Indians when the colonists arrived became vested in the
sovereign—first the discovering European nation and later the original States and the
United States—a right of occupancy in the Indian tribes was nevertheless recognized.”).
395. Ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137 (1790) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2012)).
396. See Department of Justice, General Information: Environment and Natural
Resources Division, Congress Passes the First Indian Trade and Intercourse Act, U.S. DEP’T
OF JUST. (May 14, 2015), www.justice.gov/enrd/timeline-event/congress-passes-firstindian-trade-and-intercourse-act (mandating that Congress first ratify any conveyance
of Indian interests in land).
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through treaty or conventions.397 “We emphasize what is obvious, that
the ‘trust relationship’ we affirm has as its source the Nonintercourse
Act, meaning that the trust relationship pertains to land transactions
which are or may be covered by the Act, and is rooted in rights and
duties encompassed or created by the Act.”398
The United States acquired its territory through land cessions from
foreign nations, subject to the land titles of the indigenous peoples.399
Throughout U.S. history, western settlement has followed a pattern of
Indian land cessions leading to establishment of federal territories and
then admission of new states. Congress documented this history in
painstaking detail in 1884, with the publication of Thomas
Donaldson’s report, The Public Domain: Its History, with Statistics.400
Both Donaldson and Cohen emphasize that purchase of Indian title
was always the first step.401 “From the organization of the National
Government, it has been the rule of the Nation to purchase the occupancy
right from the Indians . . . . The Government has never attempted to survey
and dispose of lands prior to their cession by the Indians.”402
Importantly, this is not only a history of land cessions; it is a history of
federal land reservations, which continue to serve as homelands for
Indian Nations. Indian land cessions and land reservations are two
sides of the same coin under the federal land laws. Since 1790, the
United States has maintained records for every cession and every
reservation of land from an Indian tribe.403 In the official records of
Congress, United States Serial Set Number 4015 includes two tables entitled:

397. See 25 U.S.C. § 177.
398. Joint Tribal Council of Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370, 379 (1st
Cir. 1975); see also CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF POLICE
POWER IN THE UNITED STATES: CONSIDERED FROM BOTH A CIVIL AND CRIMINAL STANDPOINT
355 (1886) (“The right of alienation is as much a vested right as the right of possession
or the right of enjoyment . . . .”).
399. See Cohen, supra note 72, at 33–36, 50–51 (providing case examples, such as Spanish
grants for the Louisiana Territory were “subject to the rights of Indian occupancy”).
400. DONALDSON, supra note 74, at 240.
401. See generally Cohen, supra note 72 (discussing at length the misunderstood
process through which the United States received land from the Indians); DONALDSON,
supra note 74, at 240.
402. See DONALDSON, supra note 74, at 240.
403. See Indian Land Cessions in the United States, 1784–1894: United States Serial Set,
No. 4015, LIBR. OF CONGRESS, https://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwss-ilc.html
(last visited Oct. 17, 2018) (detailing the United States Congressional Serial Set and
providing information on the House and Senate Documents and Reports within).
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(1) Schedule of Treaties and Acts of Congress Authorizing Allotments of
Lands in Severalty, and (2) Schedule of Indian Land Cessions.404
In the broader context of federal land law, “there are three types of
reserved federal lands: military, public, and Indian.”405 Just like other
federal reservations, the vast majority of tribal lands do not have land
patents or deeds; they are reserved under treaty, executive order, or
federal statute prior to any land disposition.406 Approximately 56.2
million acres of Indian land are reserved, held in trust, or subject to the
restriction on alienation.407 Most reservations are the remainder of a
tribe’s original land base, though many others were created from the
public domain for tribes who were displaced from their homelands.408
Federal title in Indian land is embedded in current practice at the
Department of the Interior, which maintains millions of title
records.409 The Division of Land Titles and Records at the Bureau of
Indian Affairs in the Department of the Interior has twelve regional
offices, 156 employees, and an annual budget of approximately $16
million.410 It exists solely to maintain federal title in Indian land, and
has been doing so since the nineteenth century.411 It “is the office of
record for the recording of Indian land title documents, for the
404. Id. The Schedule of Indian Land Cessions table “[i]ndicat[es] the number
and location of each cession by or reservation for the Indian tribes from the
organization of the Federal Government to and including 1894, together with
descriptions of the tracts so ceded or reserved, the date of the treaty, law or executive
order governing the same, the name of the tribe or tribes affected thereby, and
historical data and references bearing thereon.” See Schedule of Indian Land Cessions,
Libr. of Congress, https://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llss&fileName=
4000/4015/llss4015.db&recNum=129 (last visited Oct. 17, 2018).
405. DON PHILPOTT, UNDERSTANDING THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR 128 (2016).
406. Id.
407. Id.
408. Id.
409. See DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS MANUAL, Part 51,
ch. 2, 1–3 (2012) [hereinafter BIAM PART 51]. “Indian land,” as used by the BIA
Division of Land Titles and Records, “is an inclusive term describing all real property
or land . . . held in trust by the United States for individual Indians or tribes, or all
lands, titles to which are held by individual Indians or tribes, subject to Federal
restrictions against alienation or encumbrance, or all lands which are subject to the
rights of use, occupancy and/or benefit of certain tribes” collectively, and “include[s]
land for which the title is held in fee simple status by Indian tribes” where subject to
the federal restriction on alienation. Id. at 3.
410. Budget Justifications and Performance Information Fiscal Year 2017: Indian Affairs,
U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, IA-RES-7 https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/uploads/
FY2017_IA_Budget_Justification.pdf [hereinafter 2017 Budget Justifications].
411. BIAM PART 51, supra note 409, ch. 4 at 1.
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maintenance of the chain-of-title, and the examination, reporting, and
certification of land title [and encumbrance] for Indian trust and
restricted [fee] lands.”412
B.

Common Legal Principles Shared with Other Federal Lands

Tribal lands are distinct, but share features with other federal lands.
First, federal land title records are found in the Department of the
Interior. Tribal leaders sometimes question why the Bureau of Indian
Affairs is housed within the Department of the Interior, along with
“rocks and trees.” It is because the Department’s original purpose was
to manage federal lands, and the lands managed by the Bureau of
Indian Affairs are the remainder or “reservations” from the vast
landscape of tribal lands subjected to nearly two centuries of
acquisition, survey, platting and sale by the federal government.413 The
Department also runs the Bureau of Land Management, the National
Park Service, Fish and Wildlife Service, U.S. Geological Survey, Bureau
of Reclamation, and the Office of Surface Mining and Insular Affairs
(U.S. island territories).414 The commonality among these government
agencies is that all manage federal lands with authority derived from
the Territory Clause, and are the offspring of the General Land
Office.415 Although tribal lands have a unique purpose to serve as tribal
homelands, many aspects of federal Indian law are comparable to
other federal land laws. The similarities are most pronounced with
land transactions, taxation, water rights, criminal law, and regulation
of non-federal inholdings.
Congress and the Department of the Interior exercise extensive
propriety control over Indian land. Large sections of Title 25 of the
U.S. Code are devoted to exercising the federal trustee’s control of
Indian lands. The Secretary of Interior is required to approve all leases
and to approve any right of way, any sale of hard rock minerals, timber,

412. Id.
413. PHILIP S. DELORIA, ET AL., REPORT ON FEDERAL ADMINISTRATION AND STRUCTURE OF
INDIAN AFFAIRS: FINAL REPORT TO THE AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMMISSION 45–46
(1976). This is not to say that Indian Affairs should remain in the Department of the
Interior. For many years, tribal leaders have been considering new administrative
structures. See id. at 49–50.
414. See Bureaus, DEP’T. OF INTERIOR, http://www.doi.gov/bureaus (last visited Oct.
17, 2018).
415. See MALCOLM J. ROHRBOUGH, THE LAND OFFICE BUSINESS: THE SETTLEMENT AND
ADMINISTRATION OF AMERICAN PUBLIC LANDS, 1789–1837 55, 62 (1968); GEORGE C.
COGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW 26 (2014).
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oil and gas, use of land for housing, and agriculture.416 In recent years,
Indian tribes have gained somewhat greater self-determination over
land management through laws such as the HEARTH Act, but even here
tribal regulations are approved by the Secretary of Interior and lease
terms are limited.417 The Bureau of Indian Affairs had a budget of over
$137 million for realty services in Indian country in its 2017 fiscal year.418
Indian lands are immune from state taxation because of their status as
federal lands. As previously discussed, Rickert found that the tax immunity
stems from the Territory Clause,419 and that “no authority exists for the
state to tax lands which are held in trust by the United States for the
purpose of carrying out its policy in reference to these Indians.”420 Rickert
is the cited authority for the string of modern cases pre-empting state
taxation of tribal lands and improvements on those lands.421
The Winters doctrine states that reserved water rights spring from the
same source for Indian reservations and all other federal lands.422 In
1908, the Supreme Court held that the right to use non-navigable
waters flowing through the Fort Berthold Reservation in Montana was
impliedly reserved by the government and the Tribe in the treaty
establishing the reservation.423 In 1963, in Arizona v. California,424 the
Supreme Court expanded the Winters Doctrine as the source of all
federally-reserved water rights for all federal lands, whether a wildlife
refuge or National Park, in an amount intended to fulfill for the
purposes of the reservation.425 For non-navigable waters, the Court

416. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 311–28 (2012) (rights-of-way); § 415(a) (leases of restricted
lands); § §§ 2102–08 (mineral resources); §§ 3101–20 (national Indian forest
resources management); §§ 3501–06 (Indian energy); §§ 3701–46 (American Indian
agricultural resource management); §§ 4101–17 (Native American housing assistance
and self-determination).
417. § 415(h).
418. See 2017 Budget Justifications, supra note 410, at IA-ST-2.
419. United States v. Rickert, 188 U.S. 432, 439 (1903) (citing Wisconsin Cent. R.R.
Co. v. Price Cty., 133 U.S. 496, 504 (1890)).
420. Id. at 441.
421. See, e.g., Bryan v. Itasca Cty., 426 U.S. 373, 392 (1976); Mescalero Apache Tribe
v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 158 (1973); Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Reservation v.
Thurston Cty. Bd. of Equalization, 724 F.3d 1153, 1155 (9th Cir. 2013).
422. See generally Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
423. Id. at 575–77.
424. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
425. See id. at 599–602; see also Harold A. Ranquist, The Winters Doctrine and How It Grew:
Federal Reservation of Rights to the Use of Water, 1975 BYU L. REV. 639, 647–49 (1975).
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cited the Territory Clause as the source of power of the United States
“to reserve water rights for its reservations and its property.”426
Congress asserts and maintains police power in the Indian country,
just as it does for other federal lands.427 Although some Indian country
crimes are unique,428 many prosecutions entail the same federal
criminal laws that apply to all other federal lands.429 Since 1817, the
Indian Country Crimes Act has extended all of the federal enclave
criminal laws to Indian country, with an exception for crimes
committed by one Indian against another.430 Moreover, since 1825,
the Department of Justice has prosecuted crimes in Indian country
under the Assimilative Crimes Act,431 which adopts state criminal laws
where there is no corresponding federal crime.432
Finally, Indian reservations and other federal reservations, like
national parks, often include privately owned fee lands within their
boundaries.433 Federal jurisdiction over private inholdings is familiar
terrain for federal land law. In Minnesota v. Block,434 the Eighth Circuit
upheld federal police jurisdiction over private lands in a wilderness
area when reasonably related to the purpose of the reservation.435 In
Celestine, the Supreme Court similarly found everything included in a
reservation—military, Indian, or otherwise—remains part of that
426. Arizona, 373 U.S. at 597–98; see also Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138
(1976) (“Reservation of water rights is empowered by the Commerce Clause, Art. I,
§ 8, which permits federal regulation of navigable streams, and the Property Clause,
Art. IV, § 3, which permits federal regulation of federal lands. The doctrine applies to
Indian reservations and other federal enclaves, encompassing water rights in navigable
and nonnavigable streams.”).
427. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1151–52 (2012).
428. § 1151 et. seq. (2012).
429. See, e.g., § 1153(a) (explaining that an Indian charged with committing a
number of crimes within Indian country, including murder, kidnapping, and other
felonies, “shall be subject to the same law and penalties as all other persons committing
any of the [listed] offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States”).
430. See Act of Mar. 3, 1817, ch. 92, § 2, 3 Stat. 383 (1817) (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2012)) (excluding “any offence [sic] committed by one Indian
against another, within any Indian boundary”).
431. See Act of Mar. 3, 1825, ch. 65, § 3, 4 Stat. 115 (1825) (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. § 13 (2012)).
432. Id.; see also Williams v. United States, 327 U.S. 711, 713 (1946) (emphasizing
that “many sections of the Federal Criminal Code apply to the reservation,” including
those covered by the Assimilative Crimes Act).
433. See Peter A. Appel, The Power of Congress “Without Limitation”: The Property Clause
and Federal Regulation of Private Property, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2001).
434. 660 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1981).
435. Id. at 1244, 1249–51.
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reservation once established by Congress. Celestine relied directly on
the Territory Clause and was confirmed by Solem v. Bartlett.436 The
entire boundary set by Congress will remain a reservation until it is
explicitly made otherwise, regardless of any individual titles within,
because Congress alone can modify the boundaries of a reservation.437
In 2016, the Supreme Court affirmed this principle with a unanimous
opinion in Nebraska v. Parker.438
The text of the Territory Clause broadly authorizes Congress to
make needful rules and regulations “respecting” the territory or other
property belonging to the United States.439 This authority includes
extra-territorial matters, so long as the federal government
demonstrates a nexus between the rule or regulation and the
protected federal territory.440 For this reason, the Territory Clause
should be considered as authority for a broad range of matters
affecting Indian tribes. The federal government has adopted a trust
responsibility to protect tribal lands not only as a natural resource, but
more importantly as homelands for tribal cultures and tribal selfgovernment. As a result, the Territory Clause provides Congress with
extensive power to protect Indian tribes even on matters that arise
outside of reservation boundaries.
IV. OMISSION FROM REVISED EDITIONS OF THE
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
It is important to acknowledge, and respectfully challenge, the
position that recent editions of the Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian
Law have taken on the Territory Clause.441 Cohen’s Handbook is the
fundamental treatise on federal Indian law, first published in 1941 by

436. 465 U.S. 463 (1984).
437. Id. at 470 (citing United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278, 285 (1909)).
438. 136 S. Ct. 1072 (2016). In this case, the State challenged a tribal liquor tax as
it applied to the Village of Pender, which is inside reservations boundaries but
generally in private ownership. Id. at 1077–78. The Supreme Court sustained the
Omaha Tribe’s argument that the reservation has not been diminished through
changes in ownership patterns. Id. at 1087–88.
439. See supra Section I.D.
440. See, e.g., United States v. Alford, 274 U.S. 264, 266–67 (1927); Camfield v. United
States, 167 U.S. 518, 528 (1897). See generally Appel, supra note 433 (discussing the
extraterritorial power extensively and the required nexus the government must show).
441. See generally COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (Nell Jessup Newton
ed., 2012) [hereinafter COHEN’S HANDBOOK (2012)]; COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW (Nell Jessup Newton 2005) [hereinafter COHEN’S HANDBOOK (2005)].
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the Department of Interior.442 In 1982, a group of law professors
published a significantly revised version of Cohen’s Handbook, reporting
that the content was “updated, reorganized, and rewritten, but the
abiding principles of Indian law have changed little since Cohen so
carefully articulated them.”443 Although Cohen’s original work
recognized the continuing role of the Territory Clause in federal
Indian law, the revised editions note only a historical purpose.444
The analysis in the revised Cohen’s Handbook may be incorrect,
beginning with the legal history of the term “Indian country.” The
2012 edition of Cohen’s Handbook states that Congress relied on Donnelly
v. United States445 for the definition in § 1151(a), “all land within the
limits of any Indian reservation,” and states that the wording comes
from the Major Crimes Act.446 Donnelly is an important case because it
clarified that Executive Order reservations are included within the
term “Indian country.”447 But Donnelly is not a Major Crimes Act
decision. The defendant was a non-Indian, the prosecution was under
the Indian Country Crimes Act, and the decision construed the thenundefined term “Indian country.”448 Donnelly considered the Major
Crimes Act only to reject an ancillary argument raised by the defendant
and is not authority for anything related to the phrase “[all land]
within the limits of any Indian reservation.”449
Instead, this primary definition of “Indian country” was derived from
the much more important and earlier Supreme Court decision in
Celestine. As discussed, Celestine was the landmark decision citing the
Territory Clause as the source of authority to include all land “within
the limits of any Indian reservation.”450 Celestine is also cited authority

442. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK (2012), supra note 441, at vii.
443. FELIX S. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW x (Rennard Strickland ed.,
1982) [hereinafter COHEN’S HANDBOOK (1982)].
444. Compare FELIX S. COHEN, COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, 94–97, 310–11
(Dep’t. of Interior 1941) [hereinafter COHEN’S HANDBOOK (1941)], with COHEN’S HANDBOOK
(2012), supra note 441, at 384–86 (briefly discussing and noting that the property clause of
Article IV is one of the powers that “[has] played a significant role historically”).
445. 228 U.S. 243 (1913).
446. COHEN’S HANDBOOK (2012), supra note 441, at 190.
447. See 228 U.S. at 256–59.
448. Id. at 252, 254, 269.
449. Id. at 269–70.
450. 215 U.S. 278, 283–85 (1909).
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in Sandoval, Pelican and Seymour.451 In this way, the revised Cohen’s
Handbook misconstrued the legal history and missed the constitutional
source of the term “Indian country.”
The revised editions also stand in contrast to Cohen’s original work.
The 1941 edition—written before the definition of “Indian country”
was created in 1948—contains an extensive discussion of federal power
in a subsection titled “United States Territory and Property.”452 The
discussion of tribal lands begins by acknowledging that “[t]he control
by Congress of tribal lands has been one of the most fundamental
expressions, if not the major expression, of the constitutional power of
Congress over Indian affairs.”453 Cohen’s analysis of plenary power and
Kagama is placed within this section devoted to U.S. territorial power
and stresses the constitutional limitations created by the trust
responsibility.454 Cohen cites Justice Van Devanter: “Our decisions,
while recognizing that the government has power to control and
manage the property and affairs of its Indian wards in good faith for
their welfare, show that this power is subject to constitutional
limitations and does not enable the government to give the lands of
one tribe or band to another, or to deal with them as its own.”455
Unlike Cohen’s original work, the 1982 edition includes only a brief
mention of the Territory Clause, commenting that it is no longer
considered to be an important source of federal power in Indian
country.456 When did the status of tribal lands change? It does not say.
Instead, the 1982 edition works to distinguish tribal lands from public
lands, stating that “Indian property, however, is more properly
classified as private property.”457 Cohen would never have written that
sentence. In fact, in 1941, Cohen wrote, “Actually, we find that tribal
property partakes of some of the incidents of both individual private
property and public property of the United States,” at the outset of his
chapter on tribal property rights.458 The revised editions also elevate

451. See Seymour v. Superintendent of Wash. St. Penitentiary, 368 U.S. 351, 359
(1962); United States v. Pelican, 232 U.S. 442, 447, 451 (1914); United States v. Sandoval,
231 U.S. 28, 48 (1913).
452. COHEN’S HANDBOOK (1941), supra note 444, at 94.
453. Id.
454. Id. at 95–96.
455. Id. at 96 (citing Chippewa Indians of Minn. v. United States, 301 U.S. 358, 375–
76 (1937)).
456. COHEN’S HANDBOOK (1982), supra note 443, at 209.
457. Id. at 210.
458. COHEN’S HANDBOOK (1941), supra note 444, at 287.
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plenary power to a separate subsection, detached from the limitations
created by the federal trust responsibility.459 Cohen’s more careful,
contextual analysis places tribal territory, federal power, and the trust
obligation together in a relationship.460
The more recent 2005 and 2012 editions of Cohen’s Handbook dismiss
the Territory Clause even more succinctly as historically relevant only
to “activities in the territories prior to statehood.”461 This antebellum
view462 of the Territory Clause has been long abandoned.463 The
revised Cohen’s Handbook also states that “[u]nless the land taken into
trust originated as public land, however, the property clause cannot be
the source of power.”464 This statement confuses the Enclave Clause
with the Territory Clause.
The Enclave Clause requires state consent and has a limited
purpose: exclusive federal jurisdiction for the seat of federal
government and for military bases.465 The Territory Clause applies
459. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK (2012), supra note 441, at 381–82.
460. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK (1941), supra note 444, at 96.
461. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK (2012), supra note 441, at 385; COHEN’S HANDBOOK
(2005), supra note 441, at 392.
462. In 1846, Chief Justice Taney’s decision in United States v. Rogers stated that Congress
has authority over tribal lands under the Territory Clause only “where the country occupied
by them is not within the limits of one of the States.” 45 U.S. 567, 572 (1846). Eleven years
later, Justice Taney went further in Dred Scott v. Sandford and found the Territory Clause
“cannot, by any just rule of interpretation, be extended to territory which the new
Government might afterwards obtain from a foreign nation.” 60 U.S. 393, 442 (1857),
superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend XIV. The Kagama decision in 1886
returned to Taney’s assertion in Rogers that the Territory Clause did not apply within the
boundaries of a state, then found the power “not so much from the clause in the Constitution
in regard to disposing of and making rules and regulations concerning the territory and other
property of the United States, as from the ownership of the country in which the territories
are, and the right of exclusive sovereignty which must exist in the national government, and
can be found nowhere else.” 118 U.S. 375, 380 (1886). The Kagama construction of plenary
power was developed in reaction to an antebellum conception of the Territory Clause, driven
at least in part by the nation’s conflict over slavery and the Missouri Compromise. See Appel,
supra note 433, at 36–57 (discussing the largely disregarded narrow reading of the Property
Clause in the Dred Scott case).
463. See, e.g., Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 535–37 (1911) (rejecting most
forcefully the narrow view of the Territory Clause); see also CHARLES F. WILKINSON,
CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN: LAND, WATER, AND THE FUTURE OF THE WEST, 223–30,
240–42 (1992) (offering expert perspectives on public lands and reservations,
including discussions on legal history and development of land regulations).
464. COHEN’S HANDBOOK (2012), supra note 441, at 385.
465. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (“Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o exercise
exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District . . . as may, by Cession of
particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government
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more broadly to any territory or other property “belonging to the
United States.”466 Justice Story, in his Commentaries on the Constitution,
noted the limited nature of the Enclave Clause: “The public money
expended on such places, and the public property deposited in them,
and the nature of the military duties . . . all demand, that they should
be exempted from state authority.”467 Justice Story also explained the
broader reach of the Territory Clause: “The power is not confined to
the territory of the United States; but extends to ‘other property
belonging to the United States;’ so that it may be applied to the due
regulation of all other personal and real property rightfully belonging to the
United States. And so it has been constantly understood, and acted upon.”468
State consent to federal jurisdiction over all federal lands, including
Indian lands, was frequently included as a disclaimer in state enabling
acts, particularly after 1881 when the Supreme Court’s United States v.
McBratney469 decision reserved the question of whether federal jurisdiction
continued after statehood.470 Because state consent is a constitutional
requirement for the Enclave Clause, there is often confusion over
whether public lands are governed under the Enclave Clause or the
Territory Clause. The revised Cohen’s Handbook discusses these Enabling
Act provisions as progeny of Worcester v. Georgia,471 but fails to recognize
that these are reservations of authority under the Territory Clause.472
of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the
Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of
Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful Buildings . . . .”).
466. Under the Territory Clause, states retain concurrent jurisdiction over matters
that do not interfere with the federal purpose of the land. See Utah Power & Light Co.
v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 404 (1917). On tribal lands, state jurisdiction is very
limited. Draper v. United States and United States v. McBratney are examples where the
states retain jurisdiction in Indian country over crimes not involving Indians. See
Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240, 241–44, 247 (1896); United States v. McBratney,
104 U.S. 621, 624 (1881).
467. 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES:
WITH A PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE COLONIES AND
STATES BEFORE THE ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION § 1224, at 131 (Melville M.
Bigelow, 5th ed. 1994).
468. Id. § 1325, at 204.
469. 104 U.S. 621 (1881).
470. Id. at 623–24.
471. 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
472. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK (2012), supra note 441, at 500; COHEN’S HANDBOOK
(1982), supra note 443, at 268. Although the decision in Worcester does not reference
the Territory Clause directly, it uses the term “Indian territory” and confirms the
federal title interest in Indian land. 31 U.S. at 557. “Their right of occupancy has
never been questioned, but the fee in the soil has been considered in the government.

270

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:205

These provisions in the statehood acts demonstrate the link between
the dual purpose of Article IV, Section 3—to admit new states while
retaining federal jurisdiction over Indian land and other federal lands.
In each instance, the language echoes the text of the Territory
Clause—to dispose of and to regulate. Although the Enabling Acts are
strong evidence of congressional intent to reserve Territory Clause
jurisdiction, the Court has found them unnecessary because they
simply confirm the status of the land as federal territory or property.473
There are other issues with the revised Cohen’s Handbook. The history
chapter does not include the western land cessions of the original
states, the purpose of the Northwest Ordinance, or the Territory
Clause.474 The tribal lands chapter could clarify that the federal
restriction on alienation of Indian lands is the source of both federal
power and responsibilities under the Territory Clause.475
The revised Cohen’s Handbooks’ omissions may be a product of
reliance on Professor Newton’s brilliant and oft-cited article on federal
power in Indian affairs, which argued the “Court never developed the
property clause as a principle basis of [c]ongressional power.”476 The
role of the Territory Clause is not so much undeveloped as it is deeply
embedded in federal Indian law, buried under elaborate constructions
of precedent rather than citations to constitutional authority. The
burial was aided by the spotty legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 1151, the
tendency of historians to overlook the role of Indian tribes in early U.S.
history, and the federal desire to seize power without the
responsibilities to tribal lands and peoples. To Professor Newton’s
credit, much of the research in this article would have been impossible
without access to searchable databases of historic documents, or exposure
to the practices of the federal Indian land title system. These observations
are offered in a collaborative spirit to encourage reconsideration of the
Territory Clause within the subject of federal Indian law.
This may be called the right to the ultimate domain, but the Indians have a present
right of possession.” Id. at 580 (M’lean, J., concurring).
473. See, e.g., Van Brocklin v. Anderson, 117 U.S. 151, 164–65 (1886) (discussing the
opinions of two eminent constitutional scholars, Stephen Douglas and Daniel Webster,
as to the power of states over federal land held under the Territory Clause).
474. See generally COHEN’S HANDBOOK (2012), supra note 441, at 3–108 (dedicating a
chapter to the history and development of U.S. policy surrounding American Indians
from 1492 to present, yet failing to discuss land cessions, the purpose of the Northwest
Ordinance, or the Territory Clause).
475. COHEN’S HANDBOOK (2012), supra note 441, at 17–23 (noting the omission of
key elements from early U.S. and Indian history and policy).
476. Newton, supra note 18, at 210 n.73.
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V. IMPLICATIONS OF RESTORING THE ORIGINAL MEANING
OF THE TERRITORY CLAUSE
Renewed recognition of the Territory Clause may help to restore
cohesion to an area of federal law that is frequently difficult to
reconcile, and addresses many questions and problems with “plenary
power.” Just like other federal lands, Congress makes “needful rules
and regulations” to promote the federal purpose of lands belonging to
the United States.477 For Indian Nations and tribal lands, the federal
purpose is to hold self-governing native homelands aside from state
settlement and control.478 This was the original intention of the
Founders and is an uninterrupted use of the Territory Clause.479
There are other implications of renewed recognition of the
Territory Clause, but this Article will briefly mention four. The first is
the role of inherent tribal sovereignty within the text of the
Constitution; the second regards the role of state law within Indian
country; the third suggests reconsideration of Kagama; and the fourth
looks towards future legislation that will improve public safety and
support tribal government self-determination.
A.

Tribal Sovereignty within the Structure of the Constitution

Justice Thomas will not be surprised by this proposed source of
federal power in Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2. In Lara, he suggested
as much.480 However, because other federal territories such as Puerto
Rico are considered an instrumentality of the United States for double
jeopardy purposes, Justice Thomas questions whether Indian tribes
can be both separate sovereigns and subject to the Territory Clause.481
The history of the Territory Clause provides an answer to this question
about the source of tribal authority and constitutional structure.
In United States v. Wheeler,482 the Court held that the Double Jeopardy
Clause does not bar the prosecution of an Indian in a federal court
when he had previously been convicted in a tribal court of an offense
arising out of the same incident.483 The Court distinguished between
477. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
478. See supra note 272 and accompanying text.
479. See supra notes 267–269 and accompanying text.
480. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 225–26 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(suggesting that the source of congressional power over Indians might be found within
the Territory Clause).
481. Id.
482. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
483. Id. at 332.
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tribal governments and other territorial governments such as Puerto
Rico and Guam: “Before the coming of the Europeans, the tribes were
self-governing sovereign political communities.484 In contrast, a
territorial government is not acting as an independent political
community but as “an agency of the federal government.”485
Wheeler was recently confirmed by the Supreme Court in Puerto Rico v.
Sanchez Valle486 in a decision that drew attention to this distinction between
inherent and delegated authority. As Justice Kagan explained, a
territorial government derives its authority as a delegation from the
federal government.487 Conversely, Indian country is a federal territory
reserved for an Indian tribe to exercise inherent authority that has existed
since time immemorial.488
There is no doubt that Washington and Knox thought of Indian tribes as
sovereign governments. In July of 1789, two months after Washington’s
inauguration, Knox wrote to President Washington with his plan for Indian
affairs: “The independent nations and tribes of [I]ndians ought to be
considered as foreign nations, not as the subjects of any particular state.”489
Two months later, President Washington wrote to the Senate: “It doubtless
is important that all treaties and compacts formed by the United States with
other nations whether civilized or not, should be made with caution, and
executed with fidelity.”490 Washington went on to urge Congress to ratify
“the treaties with certain Indian nations.”491 These are but a few, but in the
correspondence among the Framers, there are hundreds of references to
Indian Nations.492
484. Id. at 322–23 (citations omitted).
485. Id. at 321 (citing Domenech v. Nat’l City Bank, 294 U.S. 199, 204–05 (1935).
486. See Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1876–77 (2016) (upholding
the precedent that double jeopardy attaches with respect to prosecutions in Puerto
Rico because it is not a separate sovereign).
487. Id. at 1873, n.5.
488. See id. at 1872 (noting that tribal power is a “pre-existing” sovereign power that
exists separate from federal authority).
489. Letter from Henry Knox to George Washington (Jul. 7, 1789), FOUNDERS
ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-03-02-0067 (last
visited Oct. 17, 2018).
490. Letter from George Washington to the United States Senate (Sep. 17, 1789),
FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-04-020032 (last visited Oct. 17, 2018).
491. Id.
492. The National Archives website Founders Online, http://founders.archives.gov, is
repository of the correspondence and other writings of the major participants in the
framing of the Constitution. A search for the term “Indian Nation” reveals 159 uses. The
two terms occur near each other 896 times.
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The original purpose of the Territory Clause was to prevent crime
and violence on the western Indian frontier.493 Washington and Knox
recognized tribal inherent jurisdiction over territory but wanted to
limit violent conflicts.494 The intent of the Territory Clause was to
harmonize the expansionist drive of settlers with the existence of tribal
territory by regulating both non-Indians who threatened the peace and the
manner in which Indian tribes exercised their inherent local powers.495
The 1896 Supreme Court decision in Talton v. Mayes496 reflects this
understanding of the relationship between inherent tribal sovereignty
and federal territorial authority. The defendant challenged his
conviction where the Cherokee tribal court provided only five grand
jury members.497 The Court held the Fifth Amendment guarantee of
indictment by grand jury inapplicable to tribal courts: “But the
existence of the right in [C]ongress to regulate the manner in which
the local powers of the Cherokee Nation shall be exercised does not
render such local powers federal powers arising from and created by
the Constitution of the United States.”498
In this way, the Supreme Court recognized inherent tribal
sovereignty as separate from the authority of Congress to regulate the
manner of its exercise. As in other federal territories, civil rights are
protected by federal statute and not through direct application of the
Constitution. The Indian Civil Rights Act imposes meaningful due
process constraints on tribal courts, and the right of federal habeas
corpus review in federal courts, while maintaining tribal court
independence and traditions.499 This structure is as old as the
Constitution, respectful of tribal sovereignty, and affords flexibility for
Congress to accommodate changing needs.

493. See supra notes 69–71 and accompanying text.
494. See supra notes 96–98 and accompanying text.
495. See supra notes 96–98 and accompanying text.
496. 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
497. Id. at 378–79.
498. Id. at 384.
499. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1303 (2012); see also United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954,
1962, 1966 (2016) (summarizing the due process and habeas requirements imposed
by the Indian Civil Rights Act).
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Noninterference of State Law

In two early cases, United States v. McBratney500 and Draper v. United
States,501 the Supreme Court found that a federal reservation of land
for Indian tribes did not remove the power of states to punish crimes
committed between two non-Indians, because state jurisdiction in that
limited instance did not interfere with the purpose of the reservation.502
For federal reservations of all types, Justice Van Devanter laid out the
broader principle in Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States.503 It is a
general rule of non-interference with the established purpose of any
federal lands: “True, for many purposes a State has civil and criminal
jurisdiction over lands within its limits belonging to the United States,
but this jurisdiction does not extend to any matter that is not consistent
with full power in the United States to protect its lands, to control their
use, and to prescribe in what manner others may acquire rights in
them.”504 The Supreme Court has repeatedly confirmed this principle.505
State jurisdiction on any federal land exists only to the extent that it does
not interfere with the federal purpose of the reservation, or with federal
legislation.506 If it is an Indian reservation, state jurisdiction should exist
only to the degree that it does not interfere with tribal self-government.
This is a more administrable standard than those that have
developed in the last fifty years. For example, in White Mountain v.
Bracker,507 the Supreme Court considered the issue of state taxes on
tribal land. The Court looked at the issues through the lens of the
Commerce Clause, established a balancing test—a “fact specific
inquiry” into the relative state, tribal and federal interests, where
interference with tribal self-government is permissible as long as state
interests are deemed more compelling.508 This fact-specific balancing
500. 104 U.S. 621 (1881).
501. 164 U.S. 240 (1896).
502. See Draper, 164 U.S. at 244–45, 247 (stating that the rule of “equality of
statehood” compels that federal reservations cannot deprive a state of such power);
McBratney, 104 U.S. at 623–24 (observing that Colorado’s enabling act included no
provision allowing a federal reservation to infringe the state’s authority over nonIndians within the federal reservation).
503. 243 U.S. 389 (1917).
504. Id. at 404.
505. See, e.g., Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 540 (1976); United States v.
California, 332 U.S. 19, 33–35 (1947); United States v. City & Cty. of San Francisco,
310 U.S. 16, 30 (1940); McKelvey v. United States, 260 U.S. 353, 359 (1922).
506. Utah Power & Light Co., 243 U.S. at 404.
507. 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
508. Id. at 144–45.
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test and its inconsistent application provide strong incentives for state
and local governments to assert tax jurisdiction in Indian country and
litigate any challenges. The Bracker decision creates great business
uncertainty, undermines tribal self-government and drives economic
development and tax revenue away from Indian country.509
In contrast, the Territory Clause provides a straightforward rule of
non-interference with the purposes of an Indian reservation, or with
any federal law. This principle was well stated in the landmark decision
of Williams v. Lee510 in 1959: “Essentially, absent governing Acts of
Congress, the question has always been whether the state action
infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws
and be ruled by them.”511 Williams relies on Territory Clause decisions
for this proposition.512 Viewed through the lens of the Territory
Clause, state jurisdiction should exist only to the degree that it does
not interfere with tribal self-government and the tribe’s ability to
provide for its citizens. For Indian country and the federal courts, this
is a more justiciable standard.513
C.

Reconsideration of Kagama

The source of the Plenary Power Doctrine is traced to the Supreme
Court’s 1886 decision in United States v. Kagama, upholding the Major
Crimes Act’s extension of federal jurisdiction to certain felony crimes

509. See Kelly Croman & Jonathan Taylor, Why Beggar thy Indian Neighbor? The Case
for Tribal Primacy in Taxation in Indian Country, JOINT OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON NATIVE
AFFAIRS 1, 8 (May 4, 2016), http://nni.arizona.edu/application/files/8914/6254/
9090/2016_Croman_why_beggar_thy_Indian_neighbor.pdf (arguing that the Court’s
decision created an unpredictable situation where a fact-specific balancing test of federal and
tribal interests are weighed against state interests leading to uncertain tax policies).
510. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
511. Id. at 220.
512. See id. at 218–20. Here, the Court cites Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832),
where the Court rejected Georgia’s enforcement of state statutes against the Cherokee
nation. See Williams, 358 U.S. at 218–19. The Court asserted that such reservations
were distinct communities subject only to treaties made between them and the U.S.
government. See id. at 219. This ruling has only been modified over the years where
state action would not affect tribal relations or the right of the tribes to govern
themselves. Id. at 219–20.
513. In Oneida Tribe v. Village of Hobart, Judge Posner draws an important distinction
between state taxes in Indian country, which should be forbidden, and fees for
governmental services, which are not. See 732 F.3d 837, 841–42 (7th Cir. 2013). This
distinction would be useful in ameliorating any consequences of a shift away from
Bracker balancing.
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committed by Indians.514 Kagama is widely criticized for its bare
assertion of federal power over Indian people: “It must exist in that
government, because it never has existed anywhere else, because the
theater of its exercise is within the geographical limits of the United
States, because it has never been denied, and because it alone can
enforce its laws on all the tribes.”515 However, neither the courts nor
legal scholars have reflected on the role of tribal lands and the
Territory Clause within the decision.
Kagama should be reconsidered for two reasons: one internal and one
external to the Court’s reasoning. First, apart from its broadly stated
conclusion, the bulk of the opinion wrestles with a question long settled.
Kagama’s rejection of federal Article IV authority as inapplicable after
statehood is no longer good law.516 Professor Peter Appel has written
forcefully about the disappearance of the Territory Clause from late
nineteenth Century jurisprudence, tracing it to Dred Scott v. Sanford and
the struggle over the prohibition on slavery found in the Northwest
Ordinance.517 He also detailed the broad revival of the Territory Clause
since that time, where the Supreme Court has repeatedly clarified that it
continues in force after statehood.518 The Kagama decision is a relic of its
era in many ways, and there are good reasons to revisit its reasoning.
Second, the Kagama decision had a stealthier purpose. Nine months
before the Kagama was issued, the New York Times editorialized in favor of
the General Allotment Act, “In short, the flimsy theory of tribal sovereignty
should be extirpated, the reservation system replaced by fee-simple grants
in severalty, the surplus land opened to white settlement, and the Indians
placed under the restraint and protection of ordinary and impartial laws,
with a view of making them self-reliant and self-supporting.”519

514. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 375–77, 385 (1886).
515. Id. at 384–85.
516. Id. at 380 (finding the power “not so much from the clause in the Constitution
in regard to disposing of and making rules and regulations concerning the territory
and other property of the United States, as from the ownership of the country in which
the territories are, and the right of exclusive sovereignty which must exist in the
national government, and can be found nowhere else”).
517. See Appel, supra note 433, at 44–46.
518. Id. at 93–94. Professor Appel’s article is a touchstone legal analysis of the
Territory Clause. His article did not consider the role of Indian tribes and tribal lands
in the history of the Northwest Ordinance and the Territory Clause, or limitations on
federal power that may arise from trust ownership of land.
519. The Century, The Indian Problem, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1885, https://times
machine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1885/08/09/109310997.pdf.

2018]

INDIAN COUNTRY AND THE TERRITORY CLAUSE

277

The Kagama decision arrived in the middle of Congress’s sweeping
debate on the General Allotment Act.520 Congress seized on the
plenary authority of the Kagama decision, and the General Allotment
Act was signed into law in February of 1887.521 The Kagama decision
provided Congress with plenary power to justify taking Indian land
absent tribal consent.”522 This purpose has been disavowed by
Congress and, similar to the Dred Scott decision, should be removed
from consideration as Supreme Court precedent.
D.

Congressional Authority for Expansion of
Tribal Jurisdiction over Crime

In 2013, Congress responded to over a decade of advocacy from
tribal leaders, Native women’s organizations, and many others who
demanded action to address domestic violence on Indian
reservations.523 In reauthorizing the Violence Against Women Act,
Congress included amendments to the Indian Civil Rights Act that
restored tribal government criminal jurisdiction over domestic
violence committed by non-Indian defendants.524 The new law affirms
the inherent authority of Indian tribes to exercise criminal jurisdiction
over all persons committing certain crimes within “Indian country,”
while guaranteeing rights to due process and habeas review.525 The law
alters the Supreme Court’s decision in Oliphant, which held that tribal
government criminal jurisdiction did not extend to non-Indians,
absent further clarification from Congress.526 After five years of

520. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 559–60, n.9 (1981) (discussing the
congressional debate regarding the allotments).
521. See Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887).
522. The Century, supra note 519.
523. See generally National Congress of American Indians, VAWA’S 2013 SPECIAL
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CRIMINAL JURISDICTION FIVE-YEAR REPORT (2018), http://www.
ncai.org/resources/ncai-publications/SDVCJ_5_Year_Report.pdf.
524. 25 U.S.C. § 1304 (Supp. I 2013).
525. See § 1304(b)(1) (providing that “the powers of self-government of a
participating tribe include the inherent power of that tribe . . . to exercise special
domestic violence criminal jurisdiction over all persons”); see also § 1303 (authorizing
the use of habeas corpus by “any person, in a court of the United States, to test the
legality of his detention by order of an Indian tribe”).
526. 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978).
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implementation, there are now eighteen Indian tribes implementing
the law with significant success for public safety.527
Territory Clause analysis demonstrates a strong source of legislative
authority for Congress to enact this law, and to address future
questions of public safety and tribal criminal jurisdiction. Congress
can build on the original purpose of the Territory Clause: to
harmonize the existence of non-Indians within tribal self-governing
territory, by regulating both non-Indians who threaten the peace and
the manner in which Indian tribes exercise their inherent local powers.
CONCLUSION—PRINCIPLES TO ACCOMPANY THE FEDERAL TRUST
OBLIGATION TO INDIAN LANDS
The Proclamation of 1763 declared British dominion over tribal
lands from the eastern shore of North America to the Mississippi,
asserting a right of pre-emption in tribally owned lands, a system for
regulation of trade, and jurisdiction over fugitive criminals.528 This was
an assertion of dominion over territory intended to prevent violent
conflict. After the Revolutionary War, the United States found itself in
a similar position, and replicated the British Indian policy.
From our vantage point in the twenty-first century, there is a
tendency to look back and view this as paternalism. Perhaps it was, but
the alternative was violent bedlam on the frontier. Eighteenth century
European settlers in America were incredibly ethnocentric, violent,
and land hungry. Jay, later our first Chief Justice, wrote to Jefferson in
December 1786: “Indians have been murdered by our People in cold
Blood and no satisfaction given, nor are they pleased with the avidity
with which we seek to acquire their Lands.”529 Jay labeled these
frontiersmen “white Savages.”530 The purpose of the Territory Clause
was to authorize the plan from the Northwest Ordinance, a plan for

527. See, e.g., SPECIAL DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CRIMINAL JURISDICTION PILOT PROJECT
REPORT, NAT’L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS 2 (2015); Angela Riley, Crime and Governance in
Indian Country, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1564, 1595 (2016).
528. Proclamation Line of 1763, Quebec Act of 1774 and Westward Expansion, OFFICE OF
THE HISTORIAN, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1750-1775/proclamation-line1763 (last visited Oct. 17, 2018).
529. Letter to Thomas Jefferson from John Jay, (Dec. 14, 1786), FOUNDERS
ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-10-02-0457 (last
visited Oct. 17, 2018).
530. Id.
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consensual purchase of tribal lands, and orderly settlement of new
states along the western frontier.531
This was the original intent, but the United States did not keep the
Framers’ promise of good faith. Settlers and speculators continued to
invade tribal lands, violence and war ensued, and after the hostilities,
the United States used threats and intimidation to gain even greater
cessions.532 This cycle repeated itself throughout the nineteenth
century as the United States grew in military strength.533 Congress
enacted laws to take tribal lands and undermine tribal languages,
cultures and existence, and the Supreme Court wrote decisions to
justify these actions.534 These decisions were products of their times,
and legal scholars will not summon an impossible coherence out of the
Court’s plenary power jurisprudence.
Even with the terrible losses, the remaining tribal lands have survived
as a bulwark against annihilation of tribal sovereignty and tribal cultures.
Tribal lands remain the center of indigenous civilizations in the United
States, the places where the elders pass on culture, languages and
traditions to succeeding generations. They are the places where tribal
governments make their own laws, run their own schools, and have
become important sources of economic development and jobs in their
regions.535 President Nixon’s Special Message to Congress heralded the
era of tribal self-determination, and the federal government has not
attempted to take tribal lands or undermine tribal governments since that
time.536 Instead, Congress has enacted laws that expand tribal selfgovernment.537 Congress has both historic obligations and contemporary
531. See supra notes 79–80 and accompanying text.
532. See supra notes 171–185 and accompanying text.
533. ROBERT MARSHALL UTLEY & WILCOMB E. WASHBURN, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE
HISTORY OF THE INDIAN WARS 130–31, 147–48 (1977) (highlighting the struggles of
Tecumseh and other 19th century Indian leaders to prevent U.S. westward expansion).
534. See Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of
Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man’s Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 219,
258–59 (1986); Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism,
and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381, 387–88 (1993).
535. JOSEPH P. KALT ET AL., THE STATE OF THE NATIVE NATIONS: CONDITIONS UNDER
U.S. POLICIES OF SELF-DETERMINATION (2008); JONATHAN TAYLOR, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
CHANGE ON AMERICAN INDIAN RESERVATIONS: A DATABOOK OF THE US CENSUSES AND
AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY (2014).
536. Richard Nixon, Special Message to the Congress on Indian Affairs, July 8, 1970, AM.
PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2573 (last visited Oct.
17, 2018).
537. See, e.g., Indian Trust Asset Reform Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-178, 130 Stat.
432 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 5601–36 (Supp. V 2017)); Violence Against Women Act
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reasons to protect tribal lands, affirm tribal sovereign authorities, and
prevent interference with the tribal self-determination era.
In this era, federal courts are demanding closer adherence to the
text of the Constitution. Further solutions to the problems in Indian
country are likely to be legislative or will depend on principled
application of existing laws that protect tribal lands and rights. In this
time it is also reasonable to expect that good faith will be observed and
laws will be made for preventing wrongs and preserving peace and
friendship with Indian tribes. Washington’s Indian policy, framed in
the Territory Clause and the Northwest Ordinance, may find greater
acceptance in the twenty-first century, than in the nineteenth.
The federal government has asserted and held territorial jurisdiction in
Indian country since the framing of the Constitution. Since that time, it has
become embedded in the federal land title system at the Department of
Interior, in federal criminal jurisdiction administered by the Department
of Justice, and in many federal court decisions. Understanding the
Framer’s intentions brings coherence to federal Indian law, and empowers
Congress and tribal governments to work together to protect public safety
and to advance the goals of tribal self-determination.

of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127 Stat. 54 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.
Code); Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, 124 Stat. 2261 (codified
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Indian Trust Fund Management Reform Act 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-412, 108 Stat. 4239
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